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FEDERAL INTERPLEADER SINCE THE ACT OF 1936
By ZECHARIAH CHAFEE, JR.t
THE main purpose' of the Federal Interpleader Act of January 20,
1936,2 was to give the United States courts power to protect any stake-
holder who was threatened with conflicting claims asserted by citizens
of different states. The previous Act of 19263 limited such relief to
insurance, casualty and surety companies. Ordinarily, such a controversy
cannot be satisfactorily handled by a state court in the state where either
claimant resides, because a state court lacks the personal jurisdiction over
the non-resident claimant which is necessary to bind all parties. Thus
the test for success of the federal legislation is the frequency with which
interpleader has been granted in situafions where state interpleader is
impossible. Judged by this test, the Act has worked well. Relief has been
granted in every case but one whete it was invoked against citizens of
different states, and in this single exception (as we shall see) the Supreme
Court denied jurisdiction on the special ground that the real claimants
to the disputed inheritance tax were two states. In the two other recent
cases where the Court considered the Act or its predecessor, it interpreted
the legislation very liberally.
This Article will review significant points of federal interpleader cases
decided since the present statute became law. Many of them were under
1 Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.
1. This Article is the fifth of a series by the author which has appeared in the Y=At
LAW JouRNAL. The other four are: Modernizing Interplader (1921) 30 YAI.n L J.
814; Interstate Interpleader (1924) 33 Y.LE L. J. 685; Interplcader il the United States
Courts (1932) 41 YALm L. J. 1134, 42 id. 41; The Federal Interpleadcr Act of j936
(1936) 45 YALE L. J. 963, 1161. The author plans to combine the whole series, after re-
vision, into a book on Interpleader, which will also contain a discussion of the numerous
state interpleader statutes. Articles by the author in the YALL Lw JoTUn.AL will here-
after be cited without titles.
See also Burchmore, Interstate Interpleader under the Federal Act of 1936 (1937)
15 CHI-KENT L. REv. 165; Holt, Federal Interpleader Act and Conflict of Laws in Gar-
nishment (1937) 4 U. OF CHL L. RPm. 403; Cleary [Note] Federal Interplcader and Some
Recent Cases (1938) 26 Go. L. J. 1017; and references in Chafee, (1936) 45 Y= - L. J.
963, n. 1. Discussions of specific cases are cited in subsequent footnotes.
2. 49 STAT. 1096 (1936), 28 U. S. C. §41 (26) (Supp. 1938).
3. 44 STAT. 416 (1926), 28 U. S. C. § 41 (26) (1926).
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this 1936 statute; but some were under the Act of 1926, which was
continued in force as to pending suits.4 Also some attention will be paid
4. Lists of 45 reported cases under the first three Interpleader Acts until January,
1936, will be found in Chafee (1932) 41 YALE L. J. 1161, 1164-1165, nn. 103-106, and
Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 963, 965, n. 7. The citations in this footnote add 35 cases,
under the 1936 Act unless otherwise noted, making 80 cases in all decided before Novem-
ber 15, 1939. In addition, there are doubtless many unreported district court cases.
Interpleader granted. 38 cases are previously listed, and 29 are given below, making 67
in all. The new cases granting interpleader under the statutes are: Dugas v. American
Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414 (1937), aff'g, 82 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) (under 1926
Act); Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 44 (1939), aff'g, 99 F. (2d) 651
(C. C. A. 9th, 1938), aff'g, 19 F. Supp. 587 (D. Idaho 1937) ; Sbisa v. Lazar, 78 F. (2d)
77 (C. C. A. 5th, 1935) (under 1926 Act; Act not cited) ; Carnes v. Franklin Life Ins.
Co., 81 F. (2d) 800 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) (under 1926 Act); Parker v. Parker, 82 F.
(2d) 575 (C. C. A. 10th, 1936) (under 1926 Act, Act not cited); Dee v. Kansas City
Life Ins. Co., 86 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Conn. Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Bene-
dict, 88 F. (2d) 436 (C. C. A. 2d, 1937), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 694 (1937) (act not
cited, probably 1926 Act); Fort Atkinson Loan & Inv. Co. v. Merchandise Bank & T.
Co., 89 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) (probably under 1926 Act) ; Cramer v. Plioe-
nix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937), af'g, Phoenix Mut. Life
Ins. Co. v. Lafferty, 16 F. Supp. 740 (S. D. Iowa 1936) (under 1926 Act); Clark v.
Sovereign Camp, W. 0. W., 91 F. (2d) 519 (C. C. A. 10th, 1937) (act not cited, prob-
ably 1926 Act) ; Roberts v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th,
1938), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 660 (1938) (act not cited, perhaps 1926 Act); Andrews
v. Andrews, 97 F. (2d) 485 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Mason,
98 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), rev'g, 21 F. Supp. 704 (E. D. Pa. 1937); Toomey
v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938) (act not cited, perhaps 1926 Act);
Nance v. Hilliard, 101 F. (2d) 957 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939) ; Stewart v. Conn. Mut. Life
Ins. Co., 102 F. (2d) 147 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939), aff'g, 22 F. Supp. 68 (D. Mass. 1938) (bill
in nature of interpleader; act not cited, perhaps 1926 Act) ; Kohler v. Kohler, 104 F. (2d)
38 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939) (under 1926 Act) ; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spenee,
104 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), rev'g, 25 F. Supp. 633 (W. D. N. Y. 1938); Stan-
dard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Baker, 105 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), rcvg, 26 F.
Supp. 956 (W. D. Mo. 1939) (bill in nature of interpleader); Railway Express Agency
v. Jones, 106 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) (defensive interpleader) ; Bankers Life
Co. v. Landers, 13 F. Supp. 521 (S. D. Iowa 1935) (under 1926 Act, Act not cited);
Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 759, 17 F. Supp. 416 (W. D. N. Y. 1936)
(act not cited); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Segaritis, 20 F. Supp. 739 (E. D. Pa.
1937); Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Jones, 21 F. Supp. 159 (S. D. Cal. 1937) (act not
cited, perhaps 1926 Act); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326
(D. Md. 1938); Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Kit, 22 F. Supp. 1022 (E. D. Pa. 1938),
s. c., 26 F. Supp. 880 (E. D. Pa. 1939), s. c., 29 F. Supp. 260 (E. D. Pa. 1939) ; Equit-
able Life Ass. Soc. v. Arnold, 27 F. Supp. 360 (D. Mass. 1939); Metropolitan Life Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. La. 1939); Acacia Mut. Life Ins. Co. v.
Bathurst, 28 F. Supp. 781 (D. N. J. 1939).
Interpleader denied under statutes. Five cases are previously listed, and two are given
below, making seven in all. The recent cases are: Worcester County Trust Co. v. Riley,
302 U. S. 292 (1937) (no interpleader against states), aff'g, 89 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 1st,
1937) (Morton, J., dissenting), and rev'g, Worcester County Trust Co. v. Long, 14 F.
Supp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936); Security Trust & Say. Bank v. Walsh, 91 F. (2d) 481
(C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (all claimants cocitizens but interpleader granted on other grounds),
aft'g, as to 1936 Act, Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 14 F. Supp. 933 (S. D.
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to cases brought under the general diversity jurisdiction of the United
States courts and outside the scope of both interpleader statutes.5
Ru_..E 22
On September 1, 1938, the Rules of Civil Procedure for the district
courts of the United States went into effect. Rule 22, entitled Interpleader,
provides:
"(1) Persons having claims against the plaintiff may be joined
as defendants'and required to interplead when their claims are such
that the plaintiff is or may be exposed to double or multiple liability.
It is not ground for objection to the joinder that the caims of the
Cal. 1936), s.c. on 2d stage, ,VWalsh v. Tadlock, 104 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939),
aff'g, Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 22 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. Cal. 1933).
Inconchsive cases. Two cases are previously listed, and four more can be added, mak-
ing six in all: Mallers v. Equitable Life Ass. Sec., 87 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936),
cert. denied, 301 U. S. 685 (1937), s. c. 104 F. (2d) E67 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939) (both
claimants cocitizens but 1926 Act discussed); Penn Ifut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F.
Supp. 967 (W. D. Ky. 1936) (all claimants cocitizens but 1926 Act discussed); Ameri-
can United Life Ins. Co. v. Luckwan, 21 F. Supp. 39 (S. D. Cal. 1937) (costs and attor-
ney's fees not allowed where interpleader unnecessary; act not cited) ; The Pan Two, 26
F. Supp. 990 (D. Md. 1939) (semblc, interpleader available for conflicting claims under
Jones Act).
5. Interpleader granted under general federal jurisdiction outside statutes: Te'as
v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398 (1939), noted in (1939) 121 A. L. R. 1200 (bill in nature of
interpleader under original jurisdiction); Laws v. New York Life Ins. Co., 31 F. (2d)
841, 82 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Malers v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 87 F. (2d)
233 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), cert. denied, 301 U. S. 6'5 (1937), s.c., 104 F. (2d) 567 (C.
C. A. 7th, 1939) (both claimants cocitizens) ; Security Trust & Say. Band: v. Valsh,
91 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937) (all claimants cocitizens), superseding on is paoint,
Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 14 F. Supp. 933 (S. D. Cal. 1936), s.c. on
2d stage, Walsh v. Tadlock, 104 F. (2d) 131 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939). afilg. Eagle, Star &
British Dominions v. Tadlock, 22 F. Supp. 545 (S. D. Cal. 1933); Carter v. Thorton,
93 F. (2d) 529 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (both claimants cocitizens); Rosenthal v. Nev
York Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 675, judgment vacated, 304 U. S. 263 (1938), s.c., 99 F.
(2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (bill in nature of interpleader, both claimants apparently
cocitizens); Century Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First National Bank, 102 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A.
5th, 1939) (defensive interpleader under § 274b, citizenship of claimant not stated) ; Penn
Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp. 967 (W. D. Ky. 1936) (all claimants ceciti-
zens); First Nat. Bank. v. Baker, 16 F. Supp. 869 (W. D. La. 1936) (both claimants
apparently cocitizens).
Interpleader denied under general federal jurisdiction: .Massachusetts v. 'Missouri, 60
Sup. Ct. 39 (U. S. 1939) (bill in nature of interpleader under original jurisdiction) ; Carroll
v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 333 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (bill in nature of inter-
pleader, both claimants cocitizens, one claimant not joined though necessary party);
United States to Use of Deacon Bros., Inc. v. Starrett Bros. & Eken, Inc., IS F. Supp.
671 (E. D. Pa. 1937) (defensive interpleader under § 274b, citizenship of claimants not
stated, stakeholder interested).
Inconclusive ease: Hunter v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 8th,
1939) (both claimants cocitizens, appeal from interpleader decree dismissed because
issues not completely determined below).
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several claimants or the titles on which their claims depend do not
have a common. origin or are not identical but are adverse to and
independent of one another, or that the plaintiff avers that he is not
liable in whole or in part to any or all of the claimants. A defendant
exposed to similar liability may obtain such interpleader by way of
cross-claim or counterclaim. The provisions of this rule supplement
and do not in any way limit the joinder of parties permitted in Rule
20.6
"(2) The remedy herein provided is in addition to and in no
way supersedes or limits the remedy provided by Section 24 (26)
of the Judicial Code, as amended [the Interpleader Act of 19361.
Action under that section shall be conducted in accordance with
these rules."'
7
Rule 65 on Injunctions makes several important regulations as to
notice, bond, form, etc., which might easily hamper relief under the Inter-
pleader Act of 1936 if they were not expressly rendered inapplicable
thereto. Consequently subdivision (e) of this rule specifies that it does
not modify the provisions of the Interpleader Act of 1936 "relating to
preliminary injunctions in actions of interpleader or in the nature of
interpleader."s
It will be observed that Rule 22 embraces both interpleader under the
general diversity powers of the United States courts and interpleader
under the Act of 1936. The rule will probably find its greatest useful-
ness in proceedings outside the statute. So far as proceedings within
the statute are concerned, the provisions of the rule substantially repeat
the statutory clauses abolishing privity and identity and permitting
defensive int~rpleader. However, the rule makes one important liberal-
ization of relief under the Act of 1936; it allows relief when the stake-
holder is interested in the controversy by disputing his liability. Judicial
applications of the rule have been few as yet' and its main result to date
6. Rule 20 relates to permissive joinder of plaintiffs and defendants when the right
to relief or liability is asserted jointly, severally or in the alternative.
7. The Note of the Advisory Committee to Rule 22 says: "The first paragraph
provides for interpleader relief along the newer and more liberal lines of joinder in the
alternative. It avoids the confusion and restrictions that developed around actions of
strict interpleader and actions in the nature of interpleader. . . . It does not change the
rules on service of process, jurisdiction, and venue, as established by judicial decision.
The second paragraph allows an action to be brought under the recent interpleader statute
when applicable. By this paragraph all remedies under the statute are continued, but the
manner of obtaining them is in accordance with these rules." The Note adds that the
rule substantially continues such statutory provisions as those providing for interpleader
under the Uniform Bills of Lading Act and by the United States as to veterans' con-
tracts of insurance.
8. The Note of the Advisory Committee says that words in the quoted phrase are
"words of description and not of limitation."
9. Rule 22 has been twice applied. Century Ins. Co. v. First Nat. Bank, 102 F. (2d)
726 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (not under Interpleader Acts); Standard Surety & Casualty
[Vol, 49:377
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has been to encourage the district courts to take a friendly attitude
toward interpleader.
NEw TYPES OF STAKEHOLDERS
The most important provision of the Act of 1936 allowed interpleader
to be brought "by any person, firm, corporation, association, or society,"
whereas the 1926 Act benefited only insurance, casualty or surety com-
panies. It was hoped that the new law would be helpful to railroads,
warehouses, banks (especially savings banks) and oil companies, which
are all likely to be vexed by conflicting claims made by citizens of differ-
ent states. So far, however, nearly all the suits under the present statute
have been brought by life insurance companies, and very little advantage
has been taken of it by new kinds of businesses. Perhaps this is because
railroads, warehouses and banks need help much less than insurance
companies, but it is also possible that they have not yet fully realized
the opportunity offered them. At all events, the remedy is there, ready
for them to use it when needed.
Already new types of stakeholders have appeared in three or four
cases. In the important Treinies case discussed hereafter, a mining
corporation was able to adjust conflicting claims to the ownership of a
block of stock."a Thus it is clear that the Act does what was expected
of it in a recent article by a member of the New York Bar on The
Transfer Agent's Dilemma: Conflicting Claims to Shares of Stock.
An express company obtained relief in an interesting situation. 2 A
group of promoters was running a fraudulent scheme to recover the estate
of Sir Francis Drake, which they asserted to be unclaimed in England,
and had obtained much money in small sums from deluded participants
in the venture. When the Federal Government prosecuted the leader,
Hartzell, part of the victims' donations, which had been forwarded in
packages by collectors to three alleged lieutenants of Hartzell, were
in transit in the hands of an express company incorporated in Delaware.
The company retained possession of the packages, which it opened and
found to contain $24,000. After Hartzell's conviction, a victim residing
in Ohio began a federal class suit against the express company on behalf
of himself and all others similarly situated, to establish rights to the
$24,000. Six other claimants were later given leave to join in the suit.
Then the internal revenue collector for northern Illinois asserted a claim
and lien on the fund because of Hartzell's unpaid income tax of $140.000.
Other victims who had not contributed to this fund sought to recoup
Co. v. Baker, 105 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), re,'g. 26 F. Supp. 956 (WV. D. to.
1939) (under Act of 1936). Rule 65 (e) has not yet been cited by courts.
10. See note 44 infra.
11. Dewey (1939) 52 HAv L. REv. 553, 577-578.
12. Railroad Express Agency v. Tones. 106 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939).
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their losses therefrom. The three consignees also claimed the money,
asserting that they were not acting for Hartzell. The company was
allowed to file a counterclaim in the nature of a bill of interpleader, so
as to bring into the class suit the internal revenue collector, the new
group of victims and the consignees. The court said that the difficult
question whether the victims' claims could be combined to present the
jurisdictional amount of $3,000 for the class suit did not affect the
company's right to interplead. It was enough under the 1936 Act that
the fund in the stakeholder's possession exceeded $500, so long as the
other statutory requirements were fulfilled. The court considered that
the right to relief under the 1936 Act was absolute when the jurisdic-
tional facts were established; but even if relief was discretionary, the
case here warranted a favorable exercise of the court's discretion.
In The Pan Two, though not an interpleader suit, a novel use for
interpleader was proposed. 8 The Jones Act gives an action for the
wrongful death of a seaman in the course of employment to "the personal
representative," without saying whether he is to be appointed at the
domicile or at the place of suit or elsewhere. 14 A libel in admiralty under
this statute was held properly brought in the Maryland district by an
administrator appointed in Ohio, apparently the seaman's domicile. The
defendant unsuccessfully argued that the administrator could not sue
extra-territorially. Judge Chesnut admitted the possibility that two admin-
istrators appointed in different states on behalf of different sets of
relatives might sue in different districts; each court might determine
its plaintiff to be the personal representative; then if each plaintiff
recovered judgment, the defendant might have to pay twice. To meet
this difficulty, Judge Chesnut suggested that if the two courts reached
divergent conclusions as to who were the real beneficiaries, a double
payment could possibly be avoided by prompt resort to the Interpleader
Act of 1936. Such an interpleader, according to another recent case, 15
could not be obtained in admiralty, for an admiralty court has very few
equity powers; but that case lends support to the position that the United
States district court which was entertaining the proposed interpleader
action could enjoin pending admiralty suits.
Another new situation where interpleader is badly needed is presented
when the domicile of a decedent is disputed and his estate is threatened
with death taxes in two states. The Supreme Court denied such relief
13. 26 F. Supp. 990 (D. Md. 1939). See also on interpleader against administrators
and executors appointed outside the forum, Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co.,
91 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
14. 38 STAT. 1185 (1920), 46 U. S. C. § 688 (1934).
15. Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 14 F. Supp. 933, 935 (S. D. Cal.
1936), disapproving the contrary view of, 1 BENEDicT, ADmIRALTY (5th ed. 1925) and
Benedict's decision in Copp v. De Castro & Sugar Ref. Co., 8 Ben. 321, 6 Fed. Cas. 520
(E. D. N. Y. 1875).
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from double taxation in Worcester Coity Trust Company v. Riley."
Mr. Hunt had retired from business in Massachusetts, where he left his
securities in charge of the Trust Company and continued to pay Massa-
chusetts income tax. He built a house in California where he died. Each
state asserted that he was domiciled therein for the purpose of levying
inheritance taxes. The Trust Company as Massachusetts executor made
use of the Act of 1936 soon after its passage, and interpleaded the tax
officials of Massachusetts and California in the United States district
court in Boston. The Massachusetts officials readily acquiesced in the
use of the simple and convenient procedure of the statute to settle these
vexatious disputes over domicile, and Mr. Ronan, the Assistant Attorney
General of the Commonwealth, argued orally in the Supreme Court in
favor of interpleader. But the California tax officials objected to a
contest so far from home. They appeared specially to question the juris-
diction of the district court, on the ground that the executor was not
really suing them but was seeking to interplead the sovereign state of
California in violation of the Eleventh Amendment. This contention
was rejected by the district court, but accepted by the circuit court of
appeals, Judge Morton dissenting, and by a unanimous opinion of the
Supreme Court, written by Mr. Justice Stone.
This decision cannot be adequately examined except as part of a long
series of cases on double taxation. Such a discussion would carry us
far away from interpleader and might easily require a whole article
to itself. Furthermore, the decision has been widely discussed elsewhere.'
Consequently, only a few observations will be ventured here.
In the first place, there are two kinds of double taxation. In one
kind, the same property or person is taxed in two states on two different
theories. Thus X taxes A's income because he lives in X, and Y taxes
it because he earns it in Y; or X taxes stock as the home of the decedent
and Y taxes it as the place of incorporation. In the other kind of double
16. 302 U. S. 292 (1937), aff'g, 89 F. (2d) 59 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937), ,hich rcv'd,
Worcester County Trust Co. v. Long, 14 F. Supp 754 (D. Mass. 1936). After the dis-
trict court decision, certiorari was denied, 299 U. S. 567 (1936) ; but it was granted after
the circuit court of appeals had denied relief. 301 U. S. 678 (1937).
17. See Chafee (1936) 45 YALX L. J. 1161, 1169-1176 (relying on the district court
decision); Nash, And Again Multiple Taxation? (1938) 26 Gro. L. J. 28; Tweed and
Sargent, Death and Taxes are Certain-But What of Domicile? (1939) 53 HtRv. L. REV.
68; Tannenbaum, Dotble Domicile (1938) 11 So. CALIF. L. R. 329; Burchmore, isnpra
note 1, (1937) 15 Cm-K xE L. Ra,. 184; and the following notes and comments in law
reviews on various stages of litigation: (1937) 5 U. OF C. L. Rnv. 137; (1936) 15
Cm-KIaNT L. R.v. 41; (1937) 6 FomHAm L. REv. 470; (1937) 25 Gzo. L. J. 760; (1938)
26 GEo. L. J. 1016, 1025; (1936) 49 HAv. L. REV. 1378; (1936) 31 I. ., Ray. 546;
(1938) 23 IowA L. REv. 430; (1938) 22 M1mN. L. REv. 577; (1937) 15 N. Y. U. L. Q.
Ray. 128; (1937) 85 U. OF PA. L. Rav. 844; (193S) 86 U. OF PA. L. REV. 306; (1937)
11 ST. Joui's L. REv. 348; (1936) 11 Tr.p. L. Q. 103; (1938) 16 Tm.x. L. Rzv. 555;
(1938) 24 VA. L. Rrv. 457; (1939) 25 VA. L. R.Ev. 967; (1938) 44 W. V& L. Q. 393.
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taxation, a single theory is applied in both states to tax the same person
or property, but the two state governments disagree on a vital issue of
fact. The Worcester County Trust Company case falls into this class.
Both states had the same law, that a death tax is levied only at the
decedent's domicile and that a man has only one domicile. The only
dispute was, where was that domicile?
It is rather surprising that almost all the attacks on double taxation
in the Supreme Court have been directed against the first kind,' because
the second kind seems much more unjust. There is some sense if one
tax is based on ability and another on protection, just as there was sonic
sense in the old English system of plural voting where the citizen could
help choose officials wherever he owned property subject to their control.
But it is highly unfair for both state governments to tell the taxpayer,
"You have to pay only one tax," and then make him pay twice. 9 The
injustice of the situation is clearly brought out by the fact that the courts
of each state regard the other state as acting unlawfully,20 and yet neither
state gives the taxpayer any remedy.
Next, the possible reasons for federal relief can be briefly considered.
In the first kind of double taxation, the statute in one state may be
attacked on the ground that its theory of taxation violates some provision
of the United States Constitution, usually the Fourteenth Amendment.
Interpleader does not seem an appropriate remedy here. Mutual exclusive-
ness is usually absent, for the validity of the tax in one state does not
necessarily mean that the tax in the other state is invalid. And the tax-
payer can contest one of the tax statutes without having to bring in the
officials of the other state.
But when we are concerned with the second type of double taxation,
as in the Worcester County Trust Company case, the remedial possi-
bilities are quite different. Here the objection is not to the theory of
18. The only exception noted besides the Worcester County Trust Co. case itself is
City Bank Farmers Trust Co. v. Schnader, 291 U. S. 24 (1934), 293 U. S. 112 (1934).
Here the law of both states agreed that a death tax on chattels could be imposed only at
their permanent situation, and the issue was where that place was. But it took an earlier
double taxation case of the first class to force this single rule of law upon these two states.
Frick v. Pennsylvania, 268 U. S. 473 (1925).
19. The distinction between these two kinds of double taxation resembles that between
two kinds of double jeopardy. An analogy to the second type is presented by the attempt
to punish a man twice for the same crime, which is constitutionally forbidden. Yet (as
in the first type of double taxation) he *can be punished. twice or more for the same act
on different theories. For example, in prohibition days, the single act of selling liquor
in a padlocked saloon might lead to several prison sentences,-for a federal crime, a
state crime, contempt of a federal injunction and contempt of a state injunction.
20. Thus in the Dorrance controversy, the New Jersey courts regarded the Penn-
sylvania tax unwillingly paid by the estate as illegal and refused to make it an allow-
able deduction in computing the net value of the estate. Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1161, 1170, n. 21.
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the taxes, but to their doubleness. The activities of one state government
seem fair enough when viewed in isolation. It is only when the activities
of the two governments are combined, that the injustice becomes obvious.
It is like the union of the two ingredients of a Seidlitz powder. Neither
state statute can be attacked under the Fourteenth Amendment, for the
tax theory common to both statutes is admittedly reasonable. The attack
must be directed at the doubleness, due to the absence of any state
machinery for confining the taxpayer to the single tax contemplated
by the law of both states.
The vital purpose here is to get all the parties into one court with
the necessary powers to settle the controversy in that one court. Issues
of unconstitutionality are secondary and merely a means to accomplish
this purpose of a binding adjudication. Clearly this one court must he
a United States court, since no state court possesses nationwide process.
Federal jurisdiction may conceivably be obtained 1y the contention that
the doubleness of the tax is so unreasonable as to violate the Fourteenth
Amendment. However, if the parties can get into one court in some
other way, then the main issue to be decided is not a question of uncon-
stitutionality, but a clear-cut issue of fact under the state law of both
states- where is the domicile? This issue seems as appropriate for
determination in the second stage of a federal interpleader suit as many
other non-constitutional questions of fact which are constantly decided
under the Act of 1936, e.g.. whether an attempted change of the bene-
ficiary in a life insurance policy was effectively carried out.
This non-constitutional issue may conceivably be brought before a
United States court in either two ways: (1) under the diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction of the district courts; (2) under the original
jurisdiction of the Supreme Court over controversies between the states.
Both ways have been tried in recent cases.
The diversity of citizenship jurisdiction,2 ' as implemented by the
Interpleader Act of 1936, was invoked in the Worcester Couty Trust
Company case. However, it was impossible to avoid constitutional prob-
lems, because of the Eleventh Amendment. In order to deprive the tax
officials of the cloak of sovereign immunity, the stakeholder had to
contend that they were acting outside their constitutional powers. And
so the Fourteenth Amendment had to come into the case, after all, though
not in the direct manner in which it is involved in double taxation cases
of the first type, where the taxation theory of one state is attacked as
invalid.
The stakeholder contended that the Wforcester County Trust Compy;zy
case fell within the doctrine of Ex parte Youmg.2- under which a federal
21. The cocitizenship lbetween the executor and the Massachusetts tax official uas
not considered to be a bar by the district court, and would be immaterial under the
Treinies case, infra note 44.
22. 209 U. S. 123 (1908).
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injunction suit or other equity suit was permitted against a state official
who was threatening action alleged to violate the Fourteenth Amendment.
This contention was rejected by the Supreme Court.
It is difficult to determine the proper limits to the doctrine of Ez parte
Young, because that doctrine is built around a paradox. The suit is
said not to be against the state because the acts sought to be enjoined
are threatened by a private person; and yet the Fourteenth Amendment
cannot be invoked unless the plaintiff is deprived of his liberty or property
by a state. For example, negroes could not obtain its protection when
they were persecuted in Reconstruction days by the Ku Klux Klan. In
short, when the doctrine of Ex parte Young is employed, the threatened
official action is state action for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment,
and not state action for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. I have
never seen a satisfactory solution of this paradox.23 When a doctrine
is illogical, it is naturally hard to determine its logical limits. The best
explanation of the doctrine of Ex parte Young seems to me this: the
immunity given to state officials by the Eleventh Amendment should
not be greater than that possessed by federal officials under the general
principles of sovereign immunity. In spite of this amendment, it is
necessary to permit federal suits against state officials in order to prevent
serious wrongs in violation of other parts of the Constitution, particu-
larly the Fourteenth Amendment. Suits against officials may be the
only way to make the Fourteenth Amendment effective under the cir-
cumstances. The solution then becomes practical rather than logical.
Is the wrong so serious and the emergency so urgent that the United
States district court should be permitted to block the normal operation
of state machinery? Thus a problem under the Eleventh Amendment
imposes on the federal courts the duty of weighing the seriousness of
the wrong against the undesirability of interference with proceedings by
state officials.
Hence the decision of the Supreme Court in the Worcester County
Trust Company case that the Eleventh Amendment barred interpleader
may rest on either of two grounds: (1) if the estate were ultimately
subjected to taxation in both states, the Fourteenth Amendment would
not be violated; (2) although actual collection of the two taxes would
violate the Fourteenth Amendment, the mere present possibility of such
double taxation in the steps thus far taken by the tax officials in sub-
mitting the issues to their respective state courts did not constitute such
a serious wrong as to warrant the United States in stopping the officials
now. On this second view, the decision can be classed with the Supreme
23. See CoRwN, TWILIGHT OF THE SuPREa COURT (1934) 83; Home Tel. & Tel. Co.
v. Los Angeles, 227 U. S. (1913); Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (1879); Isseks,
Jurisdiction of the Lower Federal Courts to Enjoin Unauthorized Action of State Of-
ficials (1927) 40 HARv. L. REv. 969.
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Court cases denying an injunction against an alleged unconstitutional
statute on the ground that the suit is premature.2 The decision would
then mean that this sort of double taxation may be unconstitutional, but
that interpleader is not the proper remedy. There is language in the
opinion to support both explanations, and the final choice between them
must await further cases.
Finally, some procedural objections to relief deserve attention. These
were raised by the California officials, but expressly left undecided by the
Court. In some respects the proceeding differed from ordinary inter-
pleader. (1) The res had not been paid into court. This was obviously
impossible, because the amount of the tax had not been officially com-
puted in either Massachusetts or California. However, the executor was
ready to comply with the alternative requirement of the statute and file
a bond for the payment of the tax in whichever state was decided to be
the decedent's domicile. (2) Still another difficulty arose. In the ordinary
interpleader, the stakeholder is discharged on making the deposit or filing
the bond. But here, as counsel for the California officials pointed out,
the district court would merely determine whether the executor was liable
to be taxed in California or Massachusetts and then leave him to go back
to the courts and officials of that state to get his discharge. "This," he
said, "is not interpleader in its wildest dreams."'± To me the important
point is that the execptor, after protecting both sides by the bond, stands
completely aside from the controversy as to domicile. The estate would
naturally prefer the domicile wherever the taxes were lower, but the
executor would make no effort to secure such a determination. The
proposed procedure finds analogies in other interpleader situations where
the stakeholder takes no part in the second stage, but may later be called
upon to settle questions between the winning claimant and himself."'
(3) One more objection is that the injunction which is ordinarily issued
against the claimants in interpleader cannot be so effective as usual. For
example, it would run in terms only against the existing California
officials, and if these were replaced by others, those successors would
not be bound by the injunction and therefore would not be in contempt
if they pressed the California tax proceedings. Still, this difficulty could
be easily overcome by a supplemental injunction against the successors,
who could be substituted as parties to the suit. -r Furthermore, the in-
24. Examples are Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line, 211 U. S. 210 (1903); Gilchrist
v. Interborough Rapid Transit Co., 279 U. S. 159 (1929). See CuAmr., CAsEs ou EQuIT-
ARTi Rm nmIs (1936) 281-284.
25. Extract from the writer's notes of the oral argument in the Supreme Court.
26. See pp. 409-412 infra.
27. During the oral argument, the Court cited Ex tarte La Prade, 289 U. S. 444
(1933), which held that when the term of office of a state attorney general expired after
he had been enjoined from enforcing a statute, his successor in office v'ms not bound by
the injunction. However, it seems inconceivable that this can be more than a procedural
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junction does not seem an indispensable element in interpleader, although
it is usual. When the claimants are state officials, a determination of
the true domicile by the United States district court might very well
end the controversy. The losing state officials would be bound by a sense
of public decency to abide by the result without being enjoined. 8 Thus
a court which took a liberal attitude toward the procedural requirements
of interpleader might well have granted relief in the Worcester County
Trust Company case, if it had not been for the Eleventh Amendment.
In a nation with a unified government, the situation in which estates
of decedents are here left remediless would be impossible. Either only
one agency would impose death taxes; or else a single court of review
would determine domicile as between two local taxing agencies. It is
our federal system which creates the possibility of double taxation. Some-
where within that federal system we should be able to find remedies
for the frictions which that system creates. The framers of the Consti-
tution took pains to adjust many such frictions, for instance, by the
provisions for interstate free trade, for the surrender of fugitive slaves,
for the rendition of fugitives from justice; and they set tip the United
States courts to handle justiciable disputes which cut across state lines.
The Interpleader Act of 1936 provided machinery which could have
given a remedy for interstate disputes over domicile. Hence, it is disap-
pointing that the Supreme Court felt unable to oyercome the obstacles
to its use. As Judge Morton said in his dissenting opinion below:
"Considering the recognized defect in our system of taxation which
this statute is designed to cure, the example of shocking injustice
to which it has led in the Dorrance case, which is a reproach to our
law, and the constant threat of similar injustice in all cases in which
there is a dispute as to domicile, I think this statute should receive
a liberal interpretation, and that, on points which are at best rather
technical and procedural in character, doubt should be resolved in
favor of jurisdiction under this statute, which appears to be the only
practicable method of remedying the evil.
''29
In Texas v. Florida,30 another attempt was made to use interpleader
for the purpose of avoiding double inheritance taxation by bringing all
obstacle to the doctrine of Ex parte Young. If Mr. Young had resigned as attorney gen-
eral after the injunction in order to evade its operation and been succeeded by Mr. Old
surely the court would have been immediately hble to issue a fresh injunction against Mr.
Old. Even though the state authorities succeed for a time in keeping one jump ahead of
the United States courts, the judge trust be able to catch up with them eventually or
else the Fourteenth Amendment would be flouted.
28. See the quotation from Texas v. Florida, p. 390 infra.
29. 89 F. (2d) 59, 69 (C. C. A. 1st, 1937).
30. 306 U. S. 398 (1939), noted in (1939) 14 IND. L. J. 464; (1939) 24 IOWA L.




the parties to the dispute over domicile into one United States court.
This suit was not brought under the Interpleader Act of 1936. The
Eleventh Amendment, which had proved an insuperable bar to the use
of that statute, was avoided by an entirely different method. One of
the states involved in the dispute went directly to the United States
Supreme Court and asked it to determine the decedent's domicile by the
exercise of the Court's original jurisdiction over cases "in which a State
shall be Party." All the states and the representatives of the estate were
before the Court. In such a suit, as I have previously pointed out,"' the
issue does not mainly concern the constitutionality, of the double taxation
under the Fourteenth Amendment. The issue may be simply a question
of fact under state law, i.e., the law of all the states involved. Where
is the domicile at which alone the state law imposes the tax? But a new
difficulty arises, whether the plaintiff state has a sufficient interest in
the prevention of double taxation to give it a cause of action. So long
as this state gets its death tax, what does it lose if another state gets
paid as well? How is either state concerned in obtaining a binding adjudi-
cation as to a single domicile?
In Texas v. Florida, the majority of the Court got around this diffi-
culty because of a special factor which will rarely recur. Here, four states
(Texas, Florida, New York and Massachusetts) all claimed to be the
domicile of the late Colonel E. H. R. Green, son of Hetty Green; and
Texas, the plaintiff, alleged that if all four states collected death taxes,
there would not be enough property in the estate to go around. Further-
more, Texas would be deprived of its lawful tax, since the decedent's
property actually in that state was insufficient to pay the Texas tax.
Hence Texas would lose a large revenue unless it was determined that
Green's domicile was not in the other three states.
Both the bill and the majority opinion of Mr. Justice Stone stated
the suit to be a bill in the nature of interpleader, and the opinion contains
a valuable statement about such bills and strict bills of interpleaderY- The
necessary independent equitable ground of relief which distinguished
this case from a strict bill was evidently the presence of a fund, which
would be exhausted if all the claims were enforced. The Court nowhere
discussed the odd feature, that interpleader here was not sought by the
stakeholder as is usual. Although Chief Justice Doe of New Hampshire
allowed a strict bill of interpleader to be initiated by' the claimant, and
this sensible practice is permitted in the corresponding Scotch action of
multiplejoinder, the weight of authority denies the claimant this relief.3
31. See pp. 384-38 5 supra.
32. 306 U. S. 398, 406-407 (1939).
33. Sprague v. West, 127 Mass. 471 (1879) ; Hathaway v. Foy, 40 Mo. 540 (1067);
Browning v. Hilig, 69 Mo. App. 594 (1897); Am v. Am, S1 Io. App. 133 (1859);
Wenstrom Electric Co. v. Bloomer, 85 Hun. 389 (N. Y. 1895); Brown v. Arbogast &
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The case at bar might conceivably be differentiated as a bill in the nature
of interpleader, although the cases of such a bill cited by Mr. Justice
Stone were all filed by the stakeholders. Of course, the executor and
next of kin could not have filed this bill in view of Worcester County
Trust Company v. Riley, so that some state had to initiate the proceedings
in order to get a determination in which all parties could be present.
To the argument that interpleader did not lie because the usual injunc-
tion against the claimants could not properly be granted here against
sovereign states, Mr. Justice Stone made the interesting reply that a
declaration of the rights of the claimants may suffice to end the contro-
versy, without an injunction:
"While courts of equity in such suits may and frequently do give
incidental relief by injunction to secure the full benefits of the adjudi-
cation and to terminate the litigation in a single suit, they are not
bound to do so and their adjudication of the conflicting claims is
not any the less effective as res judicata because not supplemented
by injunction. We do not doubt that when the equity powers of
the Court have been invoked it has power in its discretion to give
such incidental relief by way of injunction as will make its deter-
mination the effective means of avoiding risk of loss to any of the
parties by reason of the asserted multiple tax liability. But the
plenary effect of its decision as res judicata, and considerations of
convenience in the levying of the tax by the usual state procedure,
make it unnecessary and undesirable that the Court should proceed
beyond adjudication. The fact that the Court, for reasons of policy
or convenience, does not exercise the power which it possesses and
which has been traditionally exercised in like cases between private
suitors does not deprive the suit of its character as a case or con-
troversy cognizable by the Court in an original suit."384
The dissenting opinion of Mr. Justice Frankfurter, in which Mr.
Justice Black concurred, thought that the original jurisdiction of the
Court should not be exercised to apply the doctrine of "one man, one
domicile" when this doctrine was so inappropriate to the facts. (We
suggest the possibility of a doctrine of fractional domiciles for migra-
tory millionaires; each state might get a percentage of an annual tax
or of a death tax, proportioned to the fraction of a year he resided
therein.) Mr. Justice Frankfurter also thought that the possibility of
exhaustion of the'estate was too slight to serve as the chief basis of
Bastian Co., 162 App. Div. 603, 147 N. Y. Supp. 998 (1914). Contra: Webster v. Hall,
60 N. H. 7 (1880). Connecticut has allowed relief under a broad statute. Brown v. Clark,
80 Conn. 419, 68 At!. 1001 (1908). Cf. Ackerman v. Union & New Haven Trust Co.,
90 Conn. 63, 69, 96 At!. 149, 152 (1915). See also ALA,. Conz AxN. (Michie, 1928)
§ 10390.
34. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 412 (1939).
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jurisdiction, especially as the master had now found that Texas was
not entitled to any tax and so could lose nothing. He continued:
"To extend the neat procedural device of interpleader to such a
situation is another illustration of transferring a remedy from one
legal environment to circumstances qualitatively different. To settle
the interests of different claimants to a single res where these interests
turn on narrow and relatively few facts and where conflicting claims
cannot have equal validity in experience, is one thing; it is a wholly
different thing to bring into court in a single suit all states which
even remotely might assert domiciliary claims against a decedent and
where one state court might with as much reason as another find
domicile within its state."
35
In the latest Supreme Court case on double taxation, Massachusetts v.
Missouri36 decided on November 6, 1939, the same method of getting
before the Court proved unsuccessful, because there was no possibility
of exhaustion of the estate. In this case there was no dispute as to the
decedent's domicile. Madge Barney Blake undoubtedly lived in Massa-
chusetts. But she had placed the bulk of her property in the hands of
Missouri trustees under an inter viz'os trust, and Missouri was stated to
be intending to impose an inheritance tax on this trust estate. The bill
of complaint filed by Massachusetts claimed the sole right to tax this
property under the reciprocity statutes of both states. The decedent's
estate in Massachusetts was so small that it would be exhausted by costs
and federal taxes, and hence the Massachusetts tax would have to be
paid out of the Missouri trust estate, if paid at all. So Massachusetts
sought to sue Missouri and the Missouri trustees in the Supreme Court
under its original jurisdiction, alleging that Massachusetts otherwise had
no adequate remedy, and praying the Court to adjudge which state had
jurisdiction to impose inheritance taxes on the trust estate. (Of course,
the Interpleader Act was not involved.) Leave to file the bill was denied
by a unanimous Court in an opinion of the Chief Justice. The case is
important in many ways, but only its interpleader aspects will be discussed
here.
The issues here involved the validity of the taxation theories of the
two states. Hence the case belongs to the first type of double taxation
set forth above,"7 and not to the type represented by TForcester County
Trust Company v. Riley and Texas v. Florida. The Chief Justice pointed
out this distinction:
35. Texas v. Florida, 306 U. S. 398, 432 (1939).
36. 60 Sup. Ct. 39 (U. S. 1939). *%r. Justice Butler took no part in this case. The
report does not mention interpleader, but the resemblances to Texas v. Florida lead me to
classify this case as an unsuccessful bill in the nature of interpleader.
37. See pp. 383-384 sutpra.
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". .. in Texas v. Florida . . . the controlling consideration was
that by the law of the several States concerned only a single tax could
be laid by a single State, that of the domicile." 38
The nature of the issues in the case at bar made interpleader inap-
propriate:
"It is not shown that the tax claims of the two States are mutually
exclusive. On the contrary, the validity of each claim is wholly in-
dependent of that of the other and, in the light of our recent
decisions, may constitutionally be pressed by each State without
conflict in point of fact or law with the decision of the other.","
There was no danger of depletion of a fund as in Te.vas i. Florida, for
the Missouri property was amply sufficient to pay both taxes. And the
Chief Justice intimated that Massachusetts had an adequate remedy to
collect its tax by suing the trustees in a Missouri state court, or perhaps
in a United States court in Missouri. Hence, since Massachusetts ran
no risk of losing any revenue in the event of double taxation, the Com-
monwealth was suffering no wrong and there was no justiciable con-
troversy between the two states.
Some humble doubts may be ventured about the proposition that a
state has no "interest" in getting the proper place for inheritance taxes
determined, except when double taxation will make the state lose sonie
money. Shall we say that a state is only a money-making enterprise,
"nothing better than a partnership agreement in a trade of pepper or
coffee, calico or tobacco, or some other such low concern"?4 A state is
a government and not a corporation for profit, and one of its greatest
functions is to do justice. It is interested not only in taxing, but in
taxing justly. Only thus can loyalty of citizens be preserved. Even on
a sordid basis, fairness in taxation prevents the resentment of taxpayers
which eventually leads to evasion and a loss of revenues. So when a
state finds itself in danger of imposing an unfair tax because of the
difficulty of protecting the taxpayer from a double burden, and aslfs help
from a court which can solve the dilemma by an adjudication binding
all parties, surely it presents no frivolous case. The "interest" of a state
in suing should not be limited to pecuniary interests alone.41
When Massachusetts and Missouri both sought to have the proper
place of taxation determined in order to avoid unfairness, they presented
an issue of justice worthy of decision by some court. But to say that
such controversies between states should always be determined by the
United States Supreme Court is another matter. That Court has some-
38. 60 Sup. Ct. 39, 42 (U. S. 1939).
39. Ibid.
40. BURKE. REF.ECTIONS ON THE FRENCH REVOLUTION (1790).
41. Georgia v. Tennessee Copper Co., 206 U. S. 230 (1907).
[Vol. 49: 377
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
thing better to do than survey all the wanderings of migratory million-
aires.' Such issues are much more appropriate for a United States
district court.
The best hope yet offered for relief from the persistent problem of
duplicated inheritance taxes is the intimation at the end of the Chief
justice's opinion that the controversy could be brought before a United
States district court in Missouri. There the State of Missouri, if it con-
sented, could become a party. Similarly, the dilemma of double domicile
in Worcester County Trtst Company v. Riley could perhaps have been
solved if California had voluntarily begun a federal suit in Boston or
if 'Massachusetts had voluntarily brought such a suit in California.
Perhaps the convenience of this procedure will lead states to submit
their claims to such a single impartial tribunal.
DIVERSITY OF CITIZENSHIP
Cociti.zenship betzeen the stakeholder and one claintant. It frequently
happens that a life insurance company or other stakeholder is subjected
to conflicting claims by residents of different states, and one of the
claimants lives in the state where the stakeholder is incorporated. Federal
interpleader is just as badly needed here as when the stakeholder is
incorporated in a third state. No state court can give effective relief.
However, there has been some doubt whether the absence of complete
diversity of citizenship prevented jurisdiction. The Interpleader Acts
of 1926 and 1936 required "two or more adverse claimants, citizens of
different States," but were silent as to the citizenship of the stakeholder.
Still, the legislation can reasonably be construed to allow interpleader,
if constitutionally permitted, because the statutory purpose is to protect
from double taxation stakeholders who are remediless in state courts.
This view was taken by several lower United States courts before and
after 1936."*
Fortunately, the power to grant interpleader is now assured by the
Supreme Court. In Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Company. decided on
November 6, 1939, 4  a Washington mining company had brought inter-
pleader under the 1936 Act in the United States district court in Idaho,
42. See the language of Hughes. C. J., in 'Massachusetts v. Missouri, 60 Sup. Ct. 39,
43 (U. S. 1939).
43. Cases cited in Chafee (1936) 46 YA.LE L. J. 963. 974, n. 33; Cramer v. Phoenix
fut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 8th. 1937) ; Worcester County Trust Co.
v. Long, 14 F. Supp. 754 (D. Mass. 1936), rc-v'd by Supreme Court on olher gromn:ds,
302 U. S. 292 (1937) ; Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 759, 17 F. Supp. 416
(W. D. N. Y. 1936). See also Chafee, Interpleader in the United States Couirls (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 1134, 1141-1142; Burchmore, supra note 1.
44. 60 Sup. Ct. 44 (U. S. 1939). aff'g, 99 F. (2d) 651 (C. C. A. 9th, 193,), wh"ich
aff'd, 19 F. Supp. 587 (D. Idaho 1937). 'Mr. justice Butler took no part in this case.
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against Idaho and Washington claimants, to determine the ownership
to 15,299 shares of its stock and to dividends thereon. The disputed
stock was half of a block formerly owned by Mrs. Pelkes, who died in
1922. Her will left three-quarters of her property to her second husband,
a resident of Washington, and one-quarter to a daughter by a former
marriage, Mrs. Mason, who lived in Idaho. However, the widower and
his stepdaughter, who were then on good terms, made an agreement to
take equally in accordance with the orally expressed wishes of the dead
woman; and the bulk of her property was distributed under this agree-
ment and not under the will. The Sunshine stock was then considered
to be valueless, so that no clear-cut division was made, and a certificate
for the whole block was left in the name of Mr. Pelkes. Subsequently,
the mine became a bonanza producer of silver, and Mrs. Mason claimed
that she held half the stock under a constructive trust created by the
agreement. By the time the Supreme Court had established her claim,
the 15,299 shares in dispute were worth over $150,000, and they have
sold for much more than that during the litigation. In 1933, Mr. Pelkes
assigned the disputed shares to Miss Treinies, also a citizen of Washing-
ton, who, as he asserted, had promised to support him in his old age.
Then began a long series of suits, in which the daughter claimed half
the shares, while her stepfather and Miss Treinies claimed them all. (1)
In 1935 a Washington state court in probate proceedings, in which Mrs.
Mason had appeared, upheld Pelkes' ownership in full.4" (2) In 1936,
in a proceeding where all three claimants and the mining company were
parties and which was begun before the Washington probate suit, the
Idaho Supreme Court held that the Washington judgment was void for
lack of jurisdiction over the subject-matter, and awarded the disputed
15,299 shares to Mrs. Mason.4" A final decree to that effect was then
entered by the lower state court. Each claimant thus had a judgment
on his home grounds. (3) The mining company, faced with these incon-
sistent judgments and a new Washington state suit to have the Idaho
decree declared void for lack of jurisdiction,47 decided it had to do some-
thing to protect itself. So it interpleaded Pelkes, Miss Treinies and Mrs.
Mason under the Act of 1936, and got relief. The jurisdictional objec-
tion, that the stakeholder and the Washington claimants were cocitizens,
45. Mrs, Mason applied to the Supreme Court of Washington for a writ of prohi-
bition, on the ground that the probate court could not determine rights to the stock under
the agreement. The writ was refused.
46. Mason v. Pelkes, 57 Idaho 10, 59 P. (2d) 1087 (July 23, 1936), cert. denied, 299
U. S. 615 (1937). Certiorari was not requested to the lower Idaho court, after its final
decree on Aug. 18, 1936.
47. This was filed, after the Idaho Supreme Court decision, by Pelkes and Miss
Treinies against Mrs. Mason and the mining company to quiet title to all the stock. Fur-
ther proceedings in this suit were enjoined in the federal interpleader.
[Vol. 49: 377
FEDERAL INTERPLEADER
was not pleaded or discussed in either court below, but the Supreme
Court raised it on its own motion.
Jurisdiction in spite of the partial cocitizenship may conceivably be
sustained on either of two grounds.
First, the broad ground is tenable, that complete diversity of citizen-
ship is not required by Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution: "The
judicial Power shall extend . . to Controversies . . . between
Citizens of different States." This clause may be satisfied when there
is a genuine controversy between two claimants who reside in different
states, even though the litigation also involves another controversy
betAveen the stakeholder and the cocitizen claimant. Although in many
cases not involving interpleader the Supreme Court has denied juris-
diction unless all the parties on one side live in different states from
all those on the other side,4 the Court drew this requirement of com-
plete diversity of citizenship from the language of the statutes, and not
from the Constitution. These cases merely held that Congress had not
as yet permitted federal suits where there was partial cocitizenship. They
did not hold that Congress could not constitutionally permit such suits
if it wished, for example, by the Interpleader Acts.
The objection may be urged that the wording of the statutes under
which the Supreme Court has required complete diversity of citizenship
is exactly the same as the wording of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution. If these words in the statute demand complete diversity
of citizenship, do not they also demand it when they occur in the Con-
stitution? The best reply to this objection is, that constitutional language
may properly be given a wider interpretation than statutory language.
Since the Constitution has a broader purpose than a statute and is
intended to last for a much longer time, its wording should possess a
flexibility which is not needed in a statute. Such is the view of Mr.
Justice Holmes:
"But it is not necessarily true that income means the same thing
in. the Constitution and the act. A word is not a crystal, transparent
and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary
greafly in color and content according to the circumstances and the
time in which it is used." 49
48. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 3 Cranch. 267 (U. S. 1806) is the leading case.
49. Towne v. Eisner, 245 U. S. 418, 425. See Holmes's dissenting opinion in Eisner
v. Macomber, 252 U. S. 189, 219 (1920); Brandeis, J., dissenting in the -came case at
234; "Towne v. Eisner . . . involved a question not of constitutional power but of
statutory construction . . ." However, Pitney, J., for the majority, refused to admit the
distinction in the particular situation. Id. at 203.
Holmes, J., said in Lamar v. United States, 240 U. S. 60, 65 (1916): "The question
is in what sense the word 'officer' is used in the criminal Code [whether it includes im-
personating a Congressman] . . . The same words may have different meanings in dif-
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An additional argument for the position that partial cocitizenship is
permitted by the Constitution is found in the fact that the Supreme Court
has frequently sanctioned it in federal litigation under the judge-made
doctrines of separable controversy"0 and the ancillary jurisdiction." If
in these complex cases where one suit includes several controversies and
where justice and convenience require that the presence of two parties
from the same state in one of the controversies shall not prevent the
settlement of the entire litigation, the United States courts are enabled
to go ahead through judicial law-making, why can they not also receive
the same power to promote convenience and justice in interpleader cases
from Congressional legislation? Partial cocitizenship ought to be just
as constitutional under a statute as under a doctrine declared by a court.
Second, a narrow ground for jurisdiction in strict interpleader, despite
cocitizenship between stakeholder and one claimant, is, that the only real
controversy is that between the claimants, which is fought out in the
second stage after the stakeholder has dropped out. Since the stakeholder
admits liability to one claimant or other, he may be regarded as a nominal
party to the litigation, and it does not matter where he lives.
In the Treinies case, jurisdiction was squarely placed by Mr. Justice
Reed on this narrow ground. He expressly refused to decide whether
partial cocitizenship in an actual controversy was constitutionally per-
mitted:
"Without ruling as to possible limitations of the constitutional
grant, it is held by this Court that the statutory language of the
respective judiciary acts forbids suits in the federal courts unless
all the parties on one side are of citizenship diverse to those on the
other side. For the determination of the validity of the Interpleader
Act we need not decide whether the words of the Constitution,
'Controversies . . . between citizens of different States,' have a
different meaning from that given by judicial construction to similar
words in the Judiciary Act." 52
Having thus left the broad question open, he went ahead to state
the narrow ground, which is appropriate to a strict bill of interpfeader:
"Even though the constitutional language limits the judicial power
to controversies wholly between citizens of different states, that
requirement is satisfied here.
ferent parts of the same act and of course words may be used in a statute in a different
sense from that in which they are used in the Constitution."
See also Rugg, C. J., in Tax Comm'r v. Putnam, 227 Mass. 522, 533, 116 N. E. 904,
909 (1917).
50. Barney v. Latham, 103 U. S. 205 (1881). See Burchmore, supra note 1, at 172-
177; (1936) 36 CoL. L. Rav. 794.
51. Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 255 U. S. 356 (1921); Chafee (1932)
41 YALE L. J. 1134, 1145.
52. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 47 (U. S. 1939).
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"This is for the reason that there is a real controversy between
the adverse claimants. They are brought into the court by the com-
plainant stakeholder who simultaneously deposits the money or
property, due and involved in the dispute into the registry of the
court. This was done in this case. The act provides that the 'court
shall hear and determine the cause and shall discharge the com-
plainant from further liability.' Such deposit and discharge effec-
tually demonstrates the applicant's disinterestedness as between the
claimants and as to the property in dispute, as essential in inter-
pleaders. The complainant is a proper party for the determination
of the controversy between the adverse claimants, citizens of different
states. Their controversy could have been settled by litigation be-
tween them in the federal courts."5
3
This decision is very gratifying because it removes an undesirable
obstacle to strict bills of interpleader.
Sooner or later, the United States courts will face the question whether
cocitizenship between stakeholder and one claimant is also permitted in
bills in the nature of interpleader, which are expressly authorized by the
Act of 1936. It will sometimes happen that the stakeholder disputes
the amount claimed, or denies liability altogether because of an equitable
defense like fraud, or asserts an interest in a fund in his possession which
is insufficient to meet the demands of all the claimants. Suppose that
there is the requisite diversity of citizenship among the claimants, so
that such a stakeholder who lived in a different state from any of them
could maintain his action. Shall he be denied relief if he happens to
be a cocitizen of one claimant? Such a result would be unfortunate,
because no relief can be obtained in any state court and the stakeholder
needs the help of the United States courts just as badly as if there were
no partial cocitizenship.
This problem was expressly left open by Mr. Justice Reed.' a When
it does arise, the narrow ground used in the Treinies case will not suffice
to give jurisdiction. The stakeholder can no longer be regarded as a
nominal party. His controversy with the cocitizen claimant is as vigorous
as the controversy between the claimants. Therefore, federal relief must
rest on the broad ground above, that the Constitution permits Congress
to authorize United States courts to decide a controversy between
cocitizens in connection with another controversy between citizens of
different states. Congress has apparently sanctioned this partial co-
citizenship in the bills in the nature of interpleader, without expressly
53. Id. at 47-48. Mr. Justice Reed relied on the doctrine of separable controversy,
which was applied to a stakeholder in Salem Co. v. Manufacturers' Finance Co., 264 U. S.
182, 189 (1924).
54. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 48, n. 11 (U. S. 1939): "Di-
versity requirements for federal equity jurisdiction to avoid a multiplicity of suits from
diverse claimants with claims contested by the debtor is [are] not involved."
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mentioning the point, because the same statutory language which the
Treinies case construed to permit strict interpleader against a cocitizen
claimant applies equally well to bills in the nature of interpleader. The
only serious question is whether this statutory authorization is consti-
tutional. Inasmuch as federal relief is badly needed and the Supreme
Court itself has allowed partial cocitizenship to secure justice in other
complex situations,5 5 it is much to be hoped that the Treinies case will
be extended to uphold jurisdiction here.'
Conflicting state judgments. Before we take up two other diversity
problems left undecided by the Treinies case, something must be said
about an important and entirely different point, which was discussed by
Mr. Justice Reed. Which was binding in the federal interpleader- the
Washington judgment or the Idaho decree? Since federal interpleader
seems an admirable way out of the dilemma caused by conflicting judg-
ments in different states and is likely to be employed again for that
purpose, the matter demands attention here.
Court No. 1 (Washington) awarded the disputed shares to the Wash-
ington claimant. Then Court No. 2 (Idaho) awarded them to the Idaho
claimant. Now Court No. 3 (federal) has to decide whether the first
winner or the second prevails. The claimants had appeared in both state
courts so that only jurisdiction over the subject-matter can be questioned.
Which judgment should the United States court follow? Should it apply
the familiar doctrine of first come first served ("prior tenpore, potior
jure") ? Or does some other rule govern, for instance, "Second thoughts
are best?" Furthermore, if Court No. 1 (Washington) actually had
jurisdiction of the controversy,5 7 then Court No. 2 (Idaho) was wrong
in refusing full faith and credit to the Washington judgment. Is this
Idaho judgment, eventhough erroneous, entitled to full faith and credit
from the United States court? That is what Mr. Justice Reed held. He
55. See notes 50 and 51 supra.
56. See on this point, Chafee (1936) 45 YALz L. J. 963, 975-976; Cleary, supra note
1, at 1020-1021.
57. Although the Supreme Court refused to review the Idaho decree by collateral
attack, it seems likely that this decree would have been set aside by the court if it had
been attacked directly through a grant of certiorari to the lower Idaho state court. Since
the highest court in Washington, by refusing prohibition, had upheld the jurisdiction of
the probate court over the subject-matter and since all claimants appeared in this Wash-
ington jurisdictional contest, the Idaho courts seemed bound to recognize the Washing-
ton judgment, under Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938). On the other hand, one
wonders whether the Washington courts reached a sound result. It was odd for a pro-
bate court to pass on rights under an inter vivos agreement disconnected with the execu-
tor's duties. And on the merits, the Washington judgment seems doubtful in awarding
all the stock to the widower when his stepdaughter was given a quarter under the will
and her case for a half under the agreement looks fair. So perhaps, although both sets
of state courts erred, the right claimant won in the end.
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refused to reconsider whether the Washington court had jurisdiction,
because this question had already been decided in the negative by the
Idaho court. Hence, the later Idaho decree in favor of the daughter
was res judicata in the federal interpleader.
"This is true even though the question of the Washington jurisdic-
tion had been actually litigated and decided in favor of Pelkes in the
Washington proceedings. If decided erroneously in the Idaho pro-
ceedings, the right to review that error was in those (the Idaho)
proceedings. . . . The power of the Idaho court to examine into
the jurisdiction of the Washington court is beyond question. Even
where the decision against the validity of the original judgment is
erroneous, it is a valid exercise of judicial power by the second
court.
"One trial of an issue is enough. 'The principles of res judicata
apply to questions of jurisdiction as well as to other issues,' as well
to jurisdiction of the subject matter as of the parties."' 3
So far as can be ascertained, this is the first decision on the precise
point, that when a jurisdictional issue is contested between the parties
in one court, another court is bound by a holding in the szegatiz, e. Several
cases have taken the converse position, giving the effect of res judicata
to a contested jurisdictional decision in the affirmatiz.9 Thus the triple
play of the Treinies case went the other way around in Bidwell v. Bid-
well."' There Court No. 2 held that Court No. 1 had jurisdiction; and
hence Court No. 3 felt bound to apply the judgment of Court No. 1,
although its jurisdiction would have been considered doubtful by Court
No. 3, if that issue had been still open for relitigation. (1) The husband
got an absolute divorce in North Dakota, where the wife appeared. (2)
The wife sued for divorce in Massachusetts, contending that the North
Dakota divorce was void since neither party had a bona fide domicile
there. The husband contested and won; Massachusetts recognized the
North Dakota divorce and held that the parties were no longer married.
(3) Thereafter wife sued the husband for support in North Carolina,
alleging desertion. He set up the two prior decrees. The wife again tried
to question the validity of the North Dakota divorce. The North Carolina
court decided in the husband's favor, holding that, even though it might
not recognize the North Dakota divorce per se, it was nevertheless bound
by the Massachusetts decree. Consequently, questions of domicile or
fraud in North Dakota were no longer open. The same principle, that
it is the latest decision between the parties which is res judicata, was
applied to a non-jurisdictional issue in Donald v. J. White Lumber
58. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 50-51 (U. S. 1939).
59. See Comment (1934) 47 HAgv. L. Rnv. 525; (1939) 18 Oam. L Rv. 326.
60. 139 N. C. 402, 52 S. E. 55 (1905), noted in (1905) 2 L. R. A. m s. 325.
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Company, where Judge Bryan said: "Where there are two conflicting
judgments, the latest in point of time is the one which controls."',
The doctrine that contested decisions upholding jurisdiction are bind-
ing on the parties has been carried even farther in recent Supreme Court
cases. A court has been allowed to pass conclusively on its own juris-
diction, although this looks like raising one's self by his bootstraps. In
Baldwin v. Traveling Ml/len's Association,2 the plaintiff obtained judg-
ment in a United States court in Missouri against an Iowa corporation,
which had appeared specially and unsuccessfully sought to deny personal
jurisdiction for want of service on any authorized agent. The plaintiff
then sued the corporation on the judgment in the United States court
in Iowa, which held for the corporation because it had neither appeared
generally in Missouri nor been properly served there. This decision was
reversed by the Supreme Court, on the ground that the jurisdictional
issue had been settled affirmatively in the first suit. The public policy
which favors an end of litigation applies to decisions on jurisdiction as
on other matters. In Davis v. Davis,"3 a Virginia divorce where both
spouses appeared was held binding on a court in the District of Columbia
where the couple had formerly had their home, although that court found
that neither spouse had a real Virginia domicile. Mr. Justice Butler
said that when Virginia decided inter partes that the husband lived there,
that ended the matter. This is an extreme application of the principle of
res judicata, because it obviously facilitates collusive divorces. In Stoll
v. Gottlieb,4 the same principle was applied to jurisdiction over the
subject-matter. A bankruptcy court with all the parties before it had
held that it had power to release a non-bankrupt guarantor of bonds
issued by the bankrupt corporation, and this release was decided by the
Supreme Court to be a good defense for the guarantor when sued by a
bondholder in a state court. And yet Mr. Justice Reed, who wrote the
opinion, was by no means ready to say that bankruptcy courts have
jurisdiction to terminate the obligations of solvent persons.
The Treinies case differs from the decisions just discussed. Those cases
would have made the Idaho decree conclusive in the interpleader if that
61. 68 F. (2d) 441, 442 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
62. 283 U. S. 522 (1931).
63. 305 U. S. 32 (1938), discussed in many law reviews. Was the government of the
District of Columbia (the probable matrimonial domicile) bound by the Virginia decree
as to Virginia's jurisdiction in rem? This government was not represented in the divorce
proceedings. Perhaps the decision will start an American movement for a king's proctor
to go into other states and contest migratory divorces.
64. 305 U. S. 165 (1938), discussed in many law reviews. Other cases treating
affirmative holdings of jurisdiction as res judicata are: American Surety Co. v. Bald-
win, 287 U. S. 156 (1932) ; Adam v. Saenger, 303 U. S. 59 (1938) ; Hall v. Wilder Mfg.
Co., 293 S. W. 760 (Mo. 1927), noted in (1927) 52 A. L. R. 740; Harjie v. Anderson,
133 Wash. 506 (1925), noted in (1925) 44 A. L. R. 457. Contra: Jones, Inc. v. To-
ronto Gen. Ins. Co., [1933] 2 D. L. R. 660 (three courts).
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decree had upheld the jurisdiction of the Washington court, and the
widower claimant had won. The Treinies case held it conclusive when
it denied Washington jurisdiction. Yet this distinction was wisely ignored
by the Supreme Court. The rule ought to work both ways. If an Idaho
decision for jurisdiction shut out the daughter, an Idaho decision against
jurisdiction ought to shut out her stepfather. Otherwise he could say:
"Heads I win, tails you lose."
Of course, there is a certain humor in the application of the principle
that jurisdiction ought not to be relitigated so as to enforce the judgment
of the Idaho court, which had itself flagrantly violated that principle.
Mr. Justice Reed gets out of this paradox by saying that the Supreme
Court should have been asked to review the refusal of the Idaho court
to give full faith and credit to the Washington judgment.65 This sug-
gestion creates an interesting practical situation. Since erroneous deci-
sions of one state court denying jurisdiction to another state court are
henceforth to be final unless immediately reviewed, it seems only fair
that certiorari should be rather freely granted to ascertain whether such
decisions are valid under the full faith and credit clause. Consequently,
the Trehiies case may result in a marked increase of Supreme Court
decisions about that clause.
Some claimants cocitizens. The Treinics case left open two problems
about cocitizenship among the claimants. First comes the question of
partial diversity of citizenship among three or more claimants. Assume
that C-1 and C-2 reside in state X and C-3 resides in state F. If the two
cocitizen claimants share the same interest, like Miss Treinies and the
widower, there is no difficulty; but suppose that they are opposed to each
other and also to C-3. Is federal interpleader possible, or must there
be a different state for each adverse claimant? Relief is badly needed,
since no state court can reach all three claimants. A previous Article
urged that there was sufficient diversity of citizenship to satisfy the
Interpleader Acts, and several United States courts have so held."O Some
65. In fact a request was actually made for certiorari to the Supreme Court of Idaho,
and denied. Pelkes v. Mason, 299 U. S: 615 (1937). Mr. Justice Reed disposes of this
point by saying that no certiorari was sought after the subsequent final decree of the
Idaho lower court, on new findings of fact and conclusions of law, after remittitur from
the Idaho Supreme Court. This indicates that the previous refusal of certiorari may have
been based on the prematureness of the petition. Even if it had been seasonably brought
after the lower court decree, possibly the importance of the controversy would not have
been so apparent as it became after the federal interpleader suit was heard.
66. Cases cited in Chafee (1936) 45 YI.E L. J. 961, 975, n. 37; Fort Atkinson Loan
& Inv. Co. v. Merchandise Bank & T. Co., 89 F. (2d) 942 (C. C. A. 7th, 1937) ; Cramer
v. Phoenix MIut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937) ; Roberts v. Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938); Standard Surety & Cas. Co.
v. Baker, 105 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939); rail-ay Express Agency v. Jones,
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of the reasoning in the Treinies case that the real controversy is in the
second stage leans against jurisdiction, because two cocitizens are actively
participating in that controversy. On the other hand, the existence of
jurisdiction seems to be implied by the Supreme Court in Dugas v.
American Surety Company.67  There, several adverse claimants to the
fund lived in Louisiana, and presumably some of the other claimants
belonged in the same outside state. Yet the Supreme Court enforced
the interpleader decree without question.
All claimants cocitizens. A much more difficult problem arises when
both claimants reside in the same state, and the stakeholder in a different
state. Of course suit cannot lie under the Interpleader Act, because the
claimants are not "citizens of different States," but may they be inter-
pleaded under the general diversity jurisdiction of the United States
courts? This problem was discussed in a previous Article, 8 citing cases
in lower United States courts which allowed interpleader. Several cases
since 1936 granted relief and cast fresh light on the problem."0 It was
expressly left open by Mr. Justice Reed in the Treinies case:
"We do not determine whether the ruling here is inconsistent with
the conclusion in those cases where jurisdiction was rested on
diversity of citizenship between the applicant and cocitizens who are
claimants." 
70
106 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 27
F. Supp. 791 (V. D. La. 1938).
The only recent judicial discussion is in the report of the Cramer case in the district
court. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Lafferty, 16 F. Supp. 740 (1936). Burchmore,
supra note 1, at 170, suggests that the Interpleader Act of 1936 expressly sanctions juris-
diction, since paragraph (b) puts the venue in the district of "one or more of such claim-
ants" thus implying that two or more claimants may live in the same state. In my opin-
ion not much stress can be laid on this point because the statute might conceivably refer
to the situation where the two cocitizens are asserting the same interest, which is clearly
permitted. See Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 961, 974, n. 35.
67. 300 U. S.414 (1937), stated in full infra pp. 414-417. Although the claimants made
no objection to jurisdiction, the Supreme Court might have raised the point on its own
motion as in the Treinies case. Quaere, does the doctrine that a jurisdictional issue can-
not be relitigated apply to the unappealed interpleader decree in the Dugas case? Does
it include (a) federal diversity jurisdiction, and (b) cases where jurisdiction was not
actively contested by the parties, but merely assumed by them?
68. Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1161, 1167-1169.
69. These are cited supra note 5, 1st par. For recent discussion of the question, see
Burchmore, supro note 1, at 178-181; (1938) 26 Go. L. J. 1017, 1020; Comment (1937)
51 HARv. L. REv. 168.
An analogous case, in which interpleader was granted against two claimants although
one of them could not have maintained an action against the other, is De La Rue v. Her-
ner, Peron & Stockwell, Ltd. [1936] 2 K. B. 164 (C. A.), noted in (1936) 10 AUsr.
L, J. 279 and in (1936) 36 COL. L. R-v. 1174.
70. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup. Ct. 44, 48, n. 17 (U. S. 1939), citing
lower court cases which granted relief.
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The problem divides itself into two parts. First, is the Act of 1936
exclusive, abolishing all possibility of federal interpleader except when
the stakeholder complies with the statutory requisites for relief? A strong
argument to this effect was made by judge Yankwich in the Southern
District of California:
"An interpretation which would, as the statute stands now, allow
one form of interpleader under general equity principles based upon
diversity of citizenship as between the plaintiff and the defendant,
and another form under the statute, in cases involving diversity of
citizenship of claimants, would give us two kinds of bills in inter-
pleader; one, dependent upon diversity of citizenship as betwveen
plaintiffs and defendants with the jurisdictional minimum of $3,000,
and another dependent upon diversity of citizenship between claim-
ants, with a jurisdictional minimum of $500. I cannot conceive that
the Congress, by enlarging the interpleader statute, has sought to
create such a situation. Rather do I believe that they intended to
cover the entire field by broadening the scope of what had previously
been a statute of limited scope for the benefit of insurance companies
only. So doing they viewed the citizenship or alienage of the stake-
holder as entirely immaterial, and his interest in the controversy as
that of a nominal party only and grounded jurisdiction upon diversity
of citizenship of the real parties in interest- the claimants."--1
But jurisdiction was upheld in an even more persuasive argument by
Circuit Judge Evans:
"Its [the insurance company's] position is grounded upon the
a.sertion that the ancient remedy of interpleader available before
the interpleader statute is still efficacious . . . not having been
abrogated by [the Interpleader Act].
"It must be admitted that there is force in appellant's [the claim-
ant's] contention that the interpleader statutes are in pari matcria
and that as to them the maxim gencralia specialibus non dcrogant
may be appropriately invoked. All rules of construction relative in
their importance, however, are helpful only in ascertaining legislative
intent. To be helpful as a guide the two statutes in pari mnateria must
conflict, overlap or disclose ambiguity. We must not overlook the
fact that we are here dealing with remedial statutes, and we should
therefore hold, if possible, that one supplements rather than sup-
plants the other. The new legislation filled a need not met by the
older act. We are therefore convinced that the views which express
the Congressional intention should be adopted. In fact we cannot
71. Eagle, Star & British Dominions v. Tadlock, 14 F. Supp. 933, 94D (S. D. Cal.
1936), superseded on this point by, Security Trust & Savings Bank v. Walsh, 91 F. (2d)
481, 481-483 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). Also contra are: Mailers v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc.,
87 F. (2d) 233 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936) ; Penn Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp.
967 (WV. D. Ky. 1936).
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understand the purpose of the later legislation, if it merely limited
and curtailed existing remedies."
' 72
It is to be hoped that this view that the Interpleader Act is not exclusive
will continue to prevail, regardless of the way in which the Supreme
Court handles the special situation of complete cocitizenship among the
claimants.
Second, if the old general federal jurisdiction over interpleader has
survived the Interpleader Acts, as previously argued, may it be invoked
when all the claimants are citizens of the same state? For strict inter-
pleader, the argument used by Mr. Justice Reed in the Treinies case
indicates that this question will be answered by the Supreme Court in
the negative. The argument that the real controversy is between the
claimants and that the stakeholder is only a nominal party works for
relief, when there is cocitizenship between the stakeholder and one claim-
ant, but it works against relief when the claimants are all cocitizens.
Jurisdiction, if it here exists, must rest on the fact that the stakeholder
resides in a different state from that of all the claimants, and this diversity
seems purely formal if it accompanies no real controversy, and the stake-
holder's presence in court is merely incidental. In addition, we have the
practical argument against federal relief, that it is not really needed,
because the stakeholder can interplead all the claimants in their own
state courts.
Against this view it may be urged that the original purpose of the
diversity jurisdiction to avoid local prejudice applies here, for the hos-
tility of a state court towards an out-of-state stakeholder may' bring
about a refusal of interpleader on more or less technical grounds. Also,
some federal courts have contended that the stakeholder is more than
a nominal party, since if interpleader is denied and he is sued by claimants
in two separate actions at law, he will then have to put up a vigorous
defense twice over. Judge Evans stressed this point in the Mailers case:
"Appellant [a claimant] argues that it was never intended that an
interpleader suit should become the instrumentality whereby resi-
dents of the same state might be forced to litigate their civil con-
troversies in the Federal court. This criticism is on the assumption
that the insurance company is not a real party to the litigation. But
such assumption is unfounded. It is true, the insurance company
concedes a liability for the full amount due upon its contracts. It
does not, however, concede liability to each [both?] of the defendants
for the full amount. Appellant asserts a liability on the part of the
insurance company to him of the entire sum of $77,232.88. Likewise,
coappellees claim a liability on the part of the insurance company to
72. Mailers v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 87 F. (2d) 233, 235 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936).
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them for a like sum. Inasmuch as it seeks to avoid a do'uble liability,
the insurance company is a real party in interest.
"Like many another law suit, when the pleadings are settled and
the trial is over, some of the controverted issues cease to be contro-
verted. So here, the mere fact that the court will ultimately limit the
insurance company's liability in this interpleader suit to $77,232.88
does not change the fact that until this question is settled, the com-
pany is subject to claims and to litigation for a sum aggregating
$154,465.76. As a real adverse party to the beneficiaries named in
the policies and to those who assert that they are beneficiaries, the
insurance company is permitted to bring this suit in the Federal
court upon a showing that its domicile is New York, and the domicile
of all the claimants is Illinois.
"Subsequent disposition of some of the issues by the court before
judgment cannot oust the Federal court of jurisdiction any more than
a change of residence of one or more of the parties after suit is begun
in the Federal court may accomplish such a result."73
Finally, if the broad ground which I have suggested for the Treinies
case (that the Constitution does not require complete diversity of citizen-
ship) should later be adopted, this may permit interpleader against
cocitizen claimants. Thus much can be said on both sides of this ques-
tion, and its eventual decision by the Supreme Court will be awaited
with interest.
Vhatever the fate of strict bills of interpleader of this type, it seems
pretty clear that a bill in the nature of interpleader against cocitizen
claimants lies whenever the stakeholder disputes liability or has some
other serious interest in the res. In that event, there is a real controversy
between citizens of different states, stakeholder versus claimants. For
example, a life insurance company, which asserts that the policy was
obtained by fraud, can seek cancellation in a United States court, even
though two citizens of the same state are contesting which is the bene-
ficiary. 4 Even if the insurance company loses on the issue of fraud,
it ought to be able to have the issue of ownership decided.
If the stakeholder who seeks a strict bill of interpleader against two
citizens of a different state is shut out at the front door, he may be able
to get in at the back door, by interpleading defensively. Suppose C-1
and C-2, citizens of state X, have conflicting claims against A, a citizen
of state Y. C-1 sues A in a state court of X for more than $3,000. A
removes to the United States court on account of diversity of citizenship,
and then files an equitable defense interpleading C-2. This method of
bringing in a cocitizen claimant was allowed by the Supreme Court in
73. See note 72 supra.
74. Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 94 F. (2d) 675, 99 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A.
8th, 1938). See other cases cited supra note 5, 1st par.
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Liberty Oil Company v. Condon National Bank." Since that decision,
defensive interpleader has been facilitated by Rule 22."
ALIENS
Aliens are not mentioned in the Interpleader Act, but some interesting
problems are suggested by two recent cases. Article III, Section 2, of
the Constitution reads: "The Judicial Power shall extend . . . to con-
troversies . . . between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign
. . Citizens or Subjects."
1. F is an alien stakeholder; the claimants C-1 and C-2 are citizens
of different states. Each claims more than $3,000. F should be able to
interplead under the Act of 1936, which makes no requirement about
the citizenship or nationality of the stakeholder. No cases have been
found.
2. If, however, C-1 and C-2 are citizens of the same state, F cannot
interplead under the statute, because the requisite diversity of citizenship
among the claimants is lacking. Does the general federal jurisdiction
over controversies between aliens and citizens apply? The problem is
substantially the same as when interpleader against cocitizen claimants
is sought by a citizen of another state. The only case found, Security
Trust & Savings Bank v. Walsh,"1 allowed the alien to interplead.
3. F, an alien residing in Maryland, has brought an action for damages
exceeding $3,000 in the United States District Court in Maryland against
a Connecticut insurance company, A, over which the court has personal
jurisdiction. The proceeds of the policy are also claimed by C-2, a New
Yorker who can be personally served in Maryland. Can A maintain a
federal bill of interpleader in Maryland against F and C-2? Not tinder
the 1936 Act, which requires the two claimants to be "citizens of different
States." But the bill seems to fall under the jurisdiction over contro-
versies with an alien. If the second stage of an interpleader be regarded
75. 260 U. S. 235 (1922), discussed in Chafee (1932) 42 YALa L. J. 41, 50.
76. Quoted pp. 379-380 supra.
Defensive interpleader in actions at law. This relief was expressly authorized by Con-
gress in paragraph (e) of the Interpleader Act of 1936. See Chafee (1936) 45 YALE
L. J. at 988; Burchmore, supra note 1, at 180. The only case noted where such relief was
given because of diversity of citizenship between the claimants is Railway Express
Agency v. Jones, 106 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939), discussed pp. 381-382 supra. Defen-
sive interpleader against cocitizens was granted in Laws v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81
F. (2d) 841, 82 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936) ; Century Ins. Co., Ltd. v. First Nat.
Bank, 102 F. (2d) 726 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939) (citing Rule 22) ; First Nat. Bank v, Baker,
16 F. Supp. 869 (W. D. La. 1936). It was denied in an action at law brought under a
federal statute. United States to Use of Deacon Bros., Inc. v. Starrett Bros. & Eken,
Inc., 18 F. Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
77. 91 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937). Compare the discussion pp. 402-406 supra.
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as the real controversy, as Mr. Justice Reed thought in the Treinies case, 8
then an alien is fighting a citizen of New York. However, if the line-up
of parties in the first stage is material, as was held in the lWalsh case
in Problem 2 above, then a citizen of Maryland as stakeholder is on
one side, and on the other side are a citizen of New York and an alien.
That seems to be diversity enough. Two objections may be made: (1)
if the Act of 1936 covers the whole field of federal interpleader, no relief
can be given here; but this contention has already been rejected in
numerous cases;79 (2) there is some authority in non-interpleader cases
that federal jurisdiction is lacking when an alien and a citizen are aligned
against a citizen of another state. For example, although a Maryland
citizen can maintain a federal tort action against two aliens as joint
wrongdoers, it is questioned whether such an action lies against one
alien and a New Yorker. In short, it is contended that the parties on
one side must be either all aliens, or else all citizens of different states
from the plaintiff. This view is unnecessarily rigid. The Constitution
and the Judicial Code seem to be satisfied so long as two citizens of the
same state are not present on both sides of the controversy. Hence the
weight of authority in non-interpleader cases favors jurisdiction8s By
analogy, although no cases have been found, the interpleader bill should
lie when service can be obtained in Maryland on both claimants.
4. Suppose, however, that the New York claimant C-2 cannot be
personally served in Maryland and F cannot be served in New York.
This would prevent the Maryland stakeholder from interpleading by an
original federal bill in either Maryland or New York. But another
remedy is conceivably open to him. The stakeholder may perhaps inter-
plead defensively in the pending federal action at law in Maryland, and
bring in the New York claimant by serving him in New York. This
United States court in Maryland now seems to have personal juris-
diction over both claimants, under the Interpleader Act of 1936. Para-
graph (2) of that statute permits the defendant in an action at law "to
set up by way of equitable defense . . .any matter which would entitle
such person . . . to file an original or ancillary bill of interpleader
• . .against the plaintiff . . . and one or more other adverse claimants,
under [the Interpleader Act] or any other provision of the Judicial Code
and the Rules of Court made pursuant thereto" (including Rule 22);
and confers on the court in which such defense is interposed the power
of nationwide service of process. Inasmuch as the discussion of Problem
3 has shown that an original bill of interpleader would lie under general
78. See note 44 supra.
79. See pp. 402-404 supra.
80. ROSE, FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PRocEDRE (4th ed. 1931) §253; the opposite
view is expressed in DOIE, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL JURISDICTION AND PROCEotUn (1923)
207.
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federal jurisdiction when there is no difficulty about personal service,
and inasmuch as this difficulty can here be overcome through nation-
wide service under the Act, it seems that paragraph (e) authorizes
defensive interpleader in the present situation.81
5. A, a Maryland stakeholder, is subjected to three adverse claims
by C-1, a citizen of New York, C-2 a citizen of Massachusetts and F,
an alien residing in Connecticut. Here interpleader under the Act of
1936 seems possible, because of the diversity of citizenship between C-1
and C-2. The absence of citizenship on the part of F may be immaterial.
A good analogy is the cases taking jurisdiction when two out of three
adverse claimants are cocitizens and the third is a citizen of another
state.82
EQUITABLE REQUISITES OF INTERPLEADER
Even though federal jurisdiction exists, interpleader will be denied
unless the facts entitle the stakeholder to this remedy. Some of the
requisites developed by English courts in the first part of the nineteenth
century and given their classical statement by Pomeroy were so rigid
that interpleader was frequently denied in situations where it was badly
needed and might have been given without any injustice to the claimants.
Consequently, the Interpleader Act of 1936 sought to define the remedy
broadly enough to take care of most, if not all, of the cases where relief
was warranted against double vexation from claimants residing in dif-
ferent states. The position of the stakeholder and the nature of the
claims were broadly stated. Pomeroy's two requirements of "same debt,
duty, or thing" and privity were expressly abolished by the clause per-
mitting the suit to be entertained "although the titles or claims of the
conflicting claimants do not have a common origin, or are not identical,
but are adverse to and independent of one another." Nothing was said
about Pomeroy's other two requirements of want of interest and absence
of independent liability, in the hope that they would be very flexibly
administered. The provisions of the statute have worked well, and
interpleader has been granted in practically every case where the district
court had jurisdiction. And in cases outside the Act, the United States
courts have continued the liberality toward interpleader which they
almost always showed before its enactment.
81. This situation existed in an unreported case in the District Court of Maryland
before Judge Chesnut, for which I am indebted to Mr. J. Crossan Cooper, Jr., of the
Maryland Bar. The case was finally settled by a consent decree.
82. See notes 68 and 69 supra. But see Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Lott, 275 Fed. 365 (D.
Cal. 1921) (claimants in Calif., N. Y., and D. C.), denying interpleader under 1917 Act.
However, residents of the District of Columbia (unlike aliens) have no status under
Article III, Section 2, of the Constitution. And it is doubtful if the Lott case would be
similarly decided today. I am now inclined to modify slightly the views expressed about
residents of territories and the District in (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 963, 975-976.
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The effect of the Act on privity has not been judicially discussed.
However, the relief granted in the case of the Sir Francis Drake fraudss
might easily have been refused if privity were still held essential. Lord
Cottenham would have found it hard to discern any relation between
the victims whose actual money was in the hands of the express com-
pany, the other victims who had not contributed to this precise fund
but wanted to recoup their losses from it, and the revenue officer who
sought to collect the defrauder's income tax out of the same money.
The abolition of the identity test (Pomeroy's "same debt, duty, or
thing") was involved in several interesting cases, which also raise ques-
tions of possible interest in the stakeholder.
In Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Masot s two life insur-
ance policies were issued by a New York company to a Pennsylvanian,
who began suit in a Pennsylvania state court for the cash surrender
value of both policies. The other claimant, a South Carolinian, possible
assignee, ordered the company not to pay the insured, and wanted to
keep the policies alive for the full face amounts by continuing to pay
premiums. The company sought to interplead under the Act of 1936
and enjoin the state suit. The district judge dismissed the bill, saying
that the South Carolinian was not a "claimant," since he was not seeking
payment or other benefit, but only possession of the policy and pre-
vention of the payment to the Pennsylvanian. This view seems too rigid.
The claims were flatly inconsistent with each other. The South Carolinian
was claiming ownership and the eventual benefit of full payment. If
he collefted, the Pennsylvanian was not entitled to the surrender value,
and vice versa. Although the two claims differed in their nature, the
fact that they were not to the "same debt, duty, or thing" was immaterial
under the Act. And so the circuit court of appeals reversed and gave
relief, relying on the statutory abolition of the identity test. Buffington,
J., said: "The statute has in view the two-fold broad equitable relief,
first, to relieve a stakeholder without interest from present litigation,
and secondly to relieve such a one from future litigation by adjudicating
the claims of all parties in one suit."
This case is very interesting because the stakeholder's liability was
not completely discharged by the interpleader, as is usual. If the South
Carolinian claimant won, the company continued liable on the policies
until the death of the insured. It could not discharge itself as to both
claimants by putting any res into court. If the company deposited the
surrender value, this would obviously not fulfill its possible liability to
83. Railway Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F. (2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939). The
facts are stated on pp. 381-382 supra.
84. 98 F. (2d) 668 (C. C. A. 3d, 1938), rez'g, 21 F. Supp. 704 (E. D. Pa. 1937);
(1938) 51 BlA.v. L. Rxv. 1448. Contra: Travelers' Ins. Co. v. Healey, F6 Hun. 524
(N. Y. Sup. Ct. G. T. 1895).
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the South Carolinian. And of course it was not willing to deposit the
face of the policies while the insured was alive. Sometimes a stake-
holder can take care of a difference in the nature of the claims by filing
a bond, as the Act permits. Should the company here have had to make
two deposits, the surrender value in cash to satisfy the Pennsylvanian
claimant and a bond for the face of the policies to satisfy the South
Carolinian? I think not. The South Carolinian was sufficiently protected
by the promises in the two policies, if their ownership and custody were
awarded to him; the company should not be required to reenforce these
promises by the additional obligation of a bond. If the court received
the surrender value from the company and the policies from the insured,
the stakeholder could properly be dismissed from the suit, and the court
could go ahead to decide between the two claimants in the second stage."8
The situation is somewhat the same, if after the death of an insured,
C-1 wants the face of the policy in cash, while C-2 wishes the company
to keep the proceeds and make periodic payments of income under a
so-called "insurance trust." Here again the company cannot get out of
its obligation completely by putting the cash amount of the policy into
court, because, if the second claimant wins, the company should hold
the money and remain obligated in the future. However, the want of
identity should not prevent interpleader; the court can hold the money
until the final decree, and then if the second claimant wins, the court can
pay the money back to the company in return for the delivery of the
necessary documents to the persons interested under the "trust."
Relief was given in a situation of this sort in Connecticut A1u'ztal Life
Insurance Company v. Stewart."0 When one claimant demanded the face
of the policy and the other sought the benefits of an "income trust," the
life insurance company was thought to be interested so as to prevent
strict interpleader, but the cause was retained for determination as a bill
in the nature of interpleader. The independent equitable ground was
not described. Perhaps the "trust" was thought to provide the necessary
equity; but two objections present themselves. (1) There is no "trust"
as against the claimant who demands cash down. (2) The existence
85. Jurisdictional amount. In the Mason case each policy was for less than $500, the
sum required by the statute, but the total amount of the two policies exceeded that sum.
This was held sufficient. Accord: Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Dunne, 2 F. Supp. 165
(S. D. N. Y. 1931). In Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Segaritis, 20 F. Supp. 739 (E. D.
Pa. 1937), the single policy involved was for $486, but the company just got under the
wire by paying in $14.03 for dividends and accumulations.
86. 22 F. Supp. 68 (D. Mass. 1938), aff'd without discussion of this point, 102 F.
(2d) 147 (C. C. A. 1st, 1939). An interesting state case granting interpleader, when one
claimant wanted a full cash payment and the other desired to have only a life-income with
remainder to the other claimant, is Equitable Life Ins. Co. v. Johnston, 222 Iowa 687,
269 N. W. 767 (1936) (one J. dissenting), superseding on rehearing, 263 N. W. 808
(1935); see (1936) 21 IOWA L. REv. 644, disapproving original decision.
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of a true trust is doubtful, because there is no res."' However, the action
of the court in granting interpleader is most desirable. In the numerous
cases of this sort which are likely to arise in future, it might be argued
that the insurance company is sufficiently disinterested if it refrains from
participating in the second stage.
The possibility of the use of flexible devices in the second stage of
interpleader was not realized in another case.8" The insured had attempted
to substitute his son and daughters as beneficiaries of a $5,000 policy
instead of his wife, and requested the company to withhold enough of
the $5,000 to pay his son that sum when he came of age with gifts over
if he died a minor. The district court discharged the company and
ordered it to pay $5,000 into court, with part of which the clerk was
to buy an endowment policy for the son, etc., as directed by the insured;
the rest of the $5,000 was to be held in court for further orders upon
submission of proper testimony. An appeal by the widow was dismissed
for want of jurisdiction, inasmuch as part of a controversy cannot be
appealed. The appellate court said that the record did not show a pur-
chase of the endowment policy by the clerk or the disposition of the
rest of the fund, and therefore the district court had not completely
determined the issues of the case. It is submitted that the clerk could
not properly purchase the endowment policy until after the widow's
claim had been negatived on appeal. If the widow won the appeal, the
endowment policy would be futile and embarrassing. On the other hand,
the clerk might have ascertained the cost of the endowment policy, so
that the district court could award the rest of the $5,000 before the case
was submitted on appeal.
Another decision of practical importance is John Hancock Mutual
Life Insurance Contpany v. Kegan.89 A $30,000 policy for the benefit
of the wife was assigned by the insured to a bank to secure a loan. The
bank supposed it had the wife's signature to the assignment. A premium
was defaulted, and then the insured died. The bank chose the optional
privilege of substituting $13,000 paid up insurance. The wife asserted
that her signature to the assignment was forged, and elected extended
term insurance for the face of the policy. The company interpleaded.
The claimants moved to dismiss the bill on the ground that the bank
claimed $13,000 and the widow $30,000, so that the company was inter-
ested to have the bank win. Judge Chesnut refused to dismiss. He said
that the bill was at any rate good as a bill in the nature of interpleader,
within the statutory clause allowing such bills. At least it was good as
to $13,000, although perhaps if the widow won, the case should be trans-
87. See Scor, CAsEs ox TRusTS (2d ed. 1931) 802, ri. 2.
88. Hunter v. Federal Life Ins. Co., 103 F. (2d) 192 (C. C. A. 8th, 1936) (not under
Acts).
89. 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938).
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ferred to the law side for the balance of $17,000. I welcome the result,
but should prefer to say that difference in amounts claimed is not
"interest," since the company can pay $30,000 into court and step aside
till the claimants have fought it out. Whatever the company hopes and
prays, it does not help the bank to win or take part in the contest. Of
course, if the bank wins, the company gets $17,000 back, but it is not
arguing for that. Hence, this seems to me a good strict bill of inter-
pleader, and I have a little trouble in finding an independent equity to
make it a bill in the nature of interpleader as the court does.
The modern inclination is to disregard slight possible interests of the
stakeholder. In a dispute over the validity of an assignment or a change
of beneficiary, the life insurance company may properly waive compliance
with its formal requirements for such action and obtain interpleader.
The payment of the money into court is often regarded as such a waiver. 0
A life insurance company is entitled to make a deduction from the face
of the policy for an unpaid premium or loan. When both claimants
agree with the company as to the amount of the deduction, the company
is plainly disinterested.Y A more difficult problem arises when the
deduction or its size is disputed by one or both claimants. It is to be
hoped that the much needed relief will not be denied on this ground,
especially if the deduction sought is a small fraction of the face of the
policy. 2 Furthermore, Rule 22 should now take care of most cases
of an interested stakeholder, because it is immaterial thereunder that
he "avers that he is not liable in whole or in part to any or all of the
claimants." This will usually enable the court to handle a case involving
interest like a bill in the nature of interpleader, without needing to find
a ground for equitable relief in addition to double vexation.
The old rule that a possible independent liability of the stakeholder
to one of the claimants is a bar to interpleader is not mentioned in the
Interpleader Act of 1936, as it was hoped that the statutory abolition
of privity would also. dispose of this other rigid requirement. Such has
been the case under the English legislation and the Uniform Warehouse
Receipts Act.93 This hope appears to be realized.04 A liberal decision
90. Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Patterson, 15 F. Supp. 759, 17 F. Supp. 416 (W. D.
N. Y. 1936); Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v. Kit, 26 F. Supp. 880 (E. D. Pa. 1939); Metro-
politan Life Ins. Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. La. 1939). Cf. Carter v.
Thornton, 93 F. (2d) 529 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938) (not under Act).
91. Cramer v. Phoenix Mut. Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 141, 148 (C. C. A. 8th, 1937).
92. See Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 961, 978-980; Smith v. Grand Lodge A. 0. U.
W., 124 Mo. App. 181, 101 S. W. 662 (1907). In a case not under the Act, interpleader
was denied because of a dispute as to amount. United States to Use of Deacon Bros.,
Inc. v. Starrett & Eken Bros., Inc., 18 F. Supp. 671 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
93. In re Mersey Docks & Harbor Board, L. R. [1899] 1 Q. B. 546 (C. A.); Rosen-
berg v. P. Viane, Inc., 109 Misc. 215, 109 N. Y. Supp. 447 (N. Y. 1919).
94. See (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 1017, 1021-1022.
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was made under the 1926 Act, although it did not expressly abolish
privity. In Dee v. Kansas City Life Iusurance Company,9  the company
had issued a policy payable to the wife of the insured, who reserved no
power to change the beneficiary. After the wife obtained a divorce, the
insured sought to change the beneficiary to his son, but the company
refused so long as the wife did not consent. After the death of the
insured, the son asserted that by state statutes and decisions he was
entitled to the insurance as the beneficiary designated by the insured, after
the divorce. The company interpleaded the divorced wife and the son.
The wife opposed interpleader because of an alleged independent liability
of the company to her based on letters and conversations, which were as-
serted to create an agreement to give her the benefits of the policy if she
continued to pay the premiums. Consequently, even if the beneficiary was
effectively changed so that the son was entitled under the policy, the
company would also have to pay the wife under the agreement, if binding.
The district court agreed that such an independent obligation, if existent,
would defeat interpleader under the 1926 Act. However, it said that
the mere presentation of an issue of independent liability did not auto-
matically throw out the bill or deprive the court of the right to ascertain
whether such a liability existed. Accordingly, the court took evidence
on the issue, found that there was no binding agreement in the wife's
favor, and awarded the insurance money to the son. This commendable
decision was affirmed on appeal.
That the same result would be more easily reached under the 1936
Act is indicated by Metropolitan Life Insurance Company v. Segaritisf0
A life insurance policy was in terms payable to the executor or admin-
istrator, but under the "facility of payment" clause the company had
the right at its election to pay the proceeds to a widow or relative or
any person who had incurred expense for the insured or for his burial.
One claimant sought payment under this clause. The other claimant
was the administrator, who unsuccessfully argued that since payment
under the clause was not of right but at the company's election, her
opponent could not have an enforceable claim against the company;
consequently, she said, there were not two bona fide adverse claimants
and the court had no jurisdiction. In refusing to dismiss the bill judge
Mars stated a broad ground for interpleader:
"It thus becomes clear that the jurisdiction of this court to enter-
tain an interpleader bill does not depend upon the validity or even
bona fides of the claims of the respective defendants. It is obvious
95. 86 F. (2d) 813 (C. C. A. 7th, 1936), noted in Comment (1937) 25 IL. B. J.
290. See also 'Malters v. Equitable Life Ass. Soc., 87 F. (2d) 233, 235 (C. C. A. 7th,
1936), not under Act; Penn. Mfut. Life Ins. Co. v. Meguire, 13 F. Supp. 967, 971 (NV. D.
Ky. 1936), not under Act.
96. 20 F. Supp. 739 (E. D. Pa. 1937).
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that in almost every case the claim of one of the parties will ulti-
mately be determined to be invalid. That, however, is a matter for
determination at the trial and cannot affect the jurisdiction of the
court. As we have shown, the purpose of an interpleader bill is as
much to protect a stakeholder from the expense of double litigation,
however groundless, as it is to protect him from the risk of double
liability. That in the opinion of the court he will ultimately escape
the latter is no ground for refusing interpleader. Nor does the mere
fact that a contractual relationship exists between the plaintiff and
one of the defendants, under which the fund is required to be paid
to such defendant, defeat the right to interpleader."
0 7
SCOPE OF INTERPLEADER DECREE
The normal purpose of interpleader is to settle the whole controversy
among the three or more parties. The stakeholder is discharged from
further liability at the end of the first stage, and the dispute between
the claimants is settled in the second stage. This purpose would be
impaired or defeated if outside litigation between two parties were
permitted. Consequently, the decree at the end of the first stage usually
enjoins the claimants from suing the stakeholder; and the Interpleader
Acts of 1926 and 1936 expressly authorize such injunctions 8 An out-
97. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co. v. Segaritis, 20 F. Supp. 739, 741. Judge Maris dis-
approved of Calloway v. Miles, 30 F. (2d) 14 (C. C. A. 6th, 1929), under 1926 Act. See
Chafee (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 41, 54-55, 60.
Attorney's fees and costs. In American United Life Ins. Co. v. Luckman, 21 F. Supp.
39 (S. D. Cal. 1937), discussed in (1938) 26 GEo. L. J. 1017, 1025, n. 32, counsel fees
and costs were denied to the stakeholder because he did not disclose the basis of one
claim. This insistence on two colorable claims is somewhat opposed to Judge Mars's
reasoning in the Segaritis case. Another objection was the stakeholder's failure to inter-
plead defensively in a pending state suit; even if the out-of-state claimants were amen-
able to California process, should resort to the federal courts be penalized? Other recent
cases on attorney's fees and costs are: Laws v. New York Life Ins. Co., 81 F. (2d) 841,
modified on rehearing, 82 F. (2d) 811 (C. C. A. 5th, 1936); Century Ins. Co., Ltd. v.
First Nat. Bank, 102 F. (2d) 726, 729 (C. C. A. 5th, 1939); Kohler v. Kohler, 104 F.
(2d) 38 (C. C. A. 9th, 1939), under 1926 Act; Railway Express Agency v. Jones, 106 F.
(2d) 341 (C. C. A. 7th, 1939); First Nat. Bank v. Baker, 16 F. Supp. 869 (W. D. La.
1936) (attorney's fees allowed when claimant intervenes); Equitable Life Ass. Soc. v.
Kit, 22 F. Supp. 1022 (E. D. Pa. 1938).
Laches. The Supreme Court twice sustained interpleader though the bill was filed
after one claimant had obtained a judgment. Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60 Sup.
Ct. 44 (U. S. 1939) ; Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414 (1937). This is a
desirable departure from the view of several earlier state decisions that relief in such a
situation is necessarily barred by laches. See (1937) 21 MINN. L. R.v. 752; CNAraE,
CASES ON EQUITABLE REmEDiES (1938) 105; Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J. 1161, 1166,
n. 12. Unreasonable delay in interpleading may lead to a denial of counsel fees. Equit-
able Life Ass. Soc. v. Kit, 22 F. Supp. 1022 (E. D. Pa. 1938), semble.
98. See Chafee (1932) 42 YALE L. J. 41, 41-45. This clause excepting interpleader
from § 265 of the Judicial Code was held valid in Treinies v. Sunshine Mining Co., 60
Sup. Ct. 44 (U. S. 1939).
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side suit between the claimants paralleling the second stage can be stopped
by a supplemental injunction,"' although not ordinarily forbidden by
the interpleader decree itself. May the court of equity go still farther
and enjoin a claimant from suing somebody who was not a party to
the interpleader ?100
This novel and interesting question was before the Supreme Court in
Dugas v. American Surety Company.' The stakeholder A was a New
York surety company, which was surety on a $20,000 qualifying bond
filed in Louisiana by a Texas insurance company, so that it could write
workmen's compensation insurance. After the insurance company had
become embarrassed and gone into a Texas receivership, the Surety Com-
pany was threatened with many claims under the qualifying bond, aggre-
gating over $60,000. Some claimants were citizens of Louisiana and
some of other states. Dugas (apparently a Louisianan), who had a
compensation claim against the insurance company, recovered a Louisi-
ana state judgment against A as surety for substantial weekly payments.
For the purpose of suspending execution pending appeal to the highest
state court, A filed an appeal bond for $10,000 with the New York
Casualty Company S as surety; the condition was to prosecute the
appeal diligently and satisfy any judgment rendered against A if cast
in the appeal. Next month A interpleaded all the claimants including
Dugas in a United States district court in Louisiana under the 1926 Act,
paying $20,000 into court for distribution among the claimants as the
court should decree. The Casualty Company S was not a party. The
bill recited all the facts about the Dugas judgment, and Dugas unsuc-
cessfully resisted relief. The final decree allowed interpleader and declared
A to have "complied with all of its obligations under the qualifying
bond . . . and . . . to be released and discharged from any and all
further liability on account of such bond." It enjoined all of the claim-
ants including Dugas from instituting or prosecuting any state or federal
suit "against the American Surety Company [A] on account of any
right or claim growing out of such bond." No appeal was taken.
The special master appointed to report on distributing the fund reported
claims exceeding $60,000, and fixed Dugas's claim as $4,160.68. He
recommended a pro rata distribution of the $20,000 fund, by which
Dugas would be cut down to $1,141.29. Dugas and other claimants
entered a stipulation acquiescing in the report, which the court con-
firmed and thus Dugas got paid about a quarter of his total claim.
99. Homer v. Lehman, 130 Md. 275, 100 At. 285 (1917).
100. An analogous question about the powers of a bankruptcy court to discharge a
non-bankrupt guarantor was raised but not decided in Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165
(1938).
101. 300 U. S. 414 (1937) (2 JJ. dissenting), aff'g, 82 F. (2d) 953 (C. C. A. Sth,
1936) (1 J. dissenting). Mr. Justice Stone took no part in this case.
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Then the vital issue of the case arose: could Dugas get his other
three-quarters from the Casualty Company S, as surety on the appeal
bond? The Casualty Company was a stranger to the interpleader suit.
This suit had halted the appeal, but the final interpleader decree did not
profess to discharge the appeal bond. Also there was a big loophole in
the final injunction. It forbade Dugas to sue the Surety Company
stakeholder A on account of the qualifying bond, but it did not forbid
him to sue the Casualty Company S on the entirely different appeal bond.
Taking advantage of this loophole, Dugas went into the same Louisiana
state court where he got his original judgment, and sued the Casualty
Company S for $3,019.39, the rest of his compensation claim. Dugas
averred the appeal bond to be forfeited, because the appeal had not been
diligently prosecuted, having been abandoned after A interpleaded. Dugas
carefully refrained from joining the stakeholder A as co-defendant in
this new suit. With equal shrewdness, he amended his petition by
reducing the amount sought to $2,999, thus forestalling a removal to
the federal court.'
The Surety Company stakeholder A then returned to the United States
district court, and was allowed to file a supplemental bill in the inter-
pleader suit to restrain Dugas from prosecuting his state suit against
the Casualty Company S. The stakeholder averred that as principal
on the appeal bond it would be bound to reimburse the Casualty Com-
pany for whatever it had to pay as surety to Dugas. Therefore, the
new suit on the appeal bond was essentially an effort to enforce the old
judgment against the stakeholder on the qualifying bond. Thus Dugas
was attempting to subject the stakeholder indirectly to liability beyond
the $20,000 deposited in the interpleader. This contention prevailed.
Although Dugas challenged the jurisdiction of the United States court,
it enjoined him on final hearing, saying that the new suit contravened
the spirit if not the letter of the interpleader decree. This injunction was
affirmed by the circuit court of appeals. Judge Sibley dissented, on the
ground that the appeal bond antedated the interpleader suit and was
nowise affected by it. He regarded that bond as like additional security
given to a creditor, who gets the full benefit of his security even though
the debtor pays unsecured claims pro rata because of bankruptcy or some
other sort of limitation upon liability. "The bond is the price of a delay
which was enjoyed."
The majority of the Supreme Court sustained the injunction against
suit on the appeal bond, although the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice
Cardozo agreed with Judge Sibley. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who
delivered the opinion of the Court, said that Dugas was attempting to
102. A decision of the lower state court dismissing this suit as premature was re-
versed on appeal, and the suit was remanded for further proceedings. Dugas v. New York
Casualty Co., 181 La. 322, 159 So. 572 (1935).
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realize on the prior judgment, notwithstanding the extinguishment of his
rights under it, and was plainly acting in contravention of the original
unappealed interpleader decree. In discussing this decree, he drew an
interesting distinction between its broad effect as an adjudication of
rights and the more limited effect of its injunction clause forbidding suits
against the stakeholder:
"His counsel . . . seeks to support the [his) contention by point-
ing out that the injunction did not directly forbid Dugas from suing
on the appeal bond, but only from instituting or prosecuting any
suit against the complainant surety on account of a right or claim
growing out of the qualifying bond. But the injunction, being only
one part of the decrees, is not the exclusive criterion of what was
determined and affected by them. Its purpose was to forestall antici-
pated departures, not to limit other provisions or restrict their
operation and effect."103
The Dugas case, although it has apparently received no attention in
legal periodicals, opens up fascinating lines for exploration. It concerns
the extent to which discharge of the principal releases the surety. It bears
on the nature of equity decrees in general, particularly their extraterri-
torial effect.1
04
BILLs IN THE NATURE OF INTERPLEADER
One of the most important provisions of the Interpleader Act of 1936
allows bills in the nature of interpleader. There was considerable judicial
doubt whether they could be brought under the 1926 Act." 5 Such a
bill may be maintained by a stakeholder who has some special ground
for equitable relief besides double vexation. The advantage is that equit-
able rules limiting strict bills are considerably relaxed. For example,
the stakeholder can get relief in the nature of interpleader although he
has a substantial interest in the controversy. Some such cases have
already been discussed in this article.' As already suggested, the
103. Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414, 427 (1937).
104. See Fall v. Eastin, 215 U. S. 1 (1909); Dobson v. Pearce, 12 N. Y. 156 (1854).
The controversy is summarized in Lorenzen, Application of Full Faith and Credit Clarse
to Equitable Decrees for the Conveyanice of Foreign Land (1925) 34 Yxnx L. J. 591;
1 CHA E AND SnPsoN, CASES ON EQTUIT (1934) 143. This problem is also affected
by Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U. S. 165 (1938).
105. See Chafee (1936) 45 YA.Er L. J. 961, 970-971.
106. Relief was given under the 1936 Act in Connecticut Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Stew-
art, 22 F. Supp. 68 (D. Mfass. 1938); John Hancock Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F.
Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938). As to the Dugas case under the 1926 Act, see note 111 infra.
Federal jurisdiction outside these statutes was involved in Texas v. Florida, 305 U. S.
398 (1939) ; Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 91 F. (2d) 481 (C. C. A. 9th, 1937).
See additional cases of bills in the nature of interpleader cited supra note 5. For previous
discussion of such bills, see under Diversity of Citizenship and under Equitable Requisites
of Interpleader. On the effect of Rule 22, see p. 412 supra.
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adoption of Rule 22 tends to minimize this distinction and turn all
interpleader into bills in the nature of interpleader.
The most important application of this clause of the 1936 Act was in
Standard Surety & Casualty Company v. Baker.' The stakeholder was
surety on a $5,000 qualifying bond filed by a broker, in order to do
business in Missouri, and conditioned upon faithful compliance with a
state statute by the broker and his salesmen. After the broker's bank-
ruptcy, his customers filed numerous actions at law against the surety
for a total of over $20,000. The surety interpleaded all the claimants
under the Act of 1936 and Rule 22. It deposited a new $5,000 bond,
conditioned on compliance with the further orders of the court with
respect to the subject matter of the controversy. The bill denied liability
as to certain types of claims. The surety company prayed judgment that
its maximum liability was $5,000; that either it was not indebted to
any claimant, or at least was not liable for certain types of wrongs of
the broker; that if there was any liability on the stakeholder's part, the
claimants should be required to interplead and the stakeholder be dis-
charged as to all persons except those whom the court should adjudge
entitled to participate in the $5,000 fund; and that action on the bond
be enjoined. A temporary injunction, issued accordingly, was afterwards
dissolved by District Judge Otis; but the Circuit Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit restored the injunction and sent the cause back for a
trial of the second stage.
Here strict interpleader was barred apart from Rule 22; the surety
disputed liability and so was heavily interested. The difficulty about a
bill in the nature of interpleader, according to Judge Otis, was in finding
conflicting claims as to the same subject matter. Each customer had a
separate and distinct claim against the broker; and the liability of the
surety was the same as that of the principal. Judge Otis thought that it
was just as if the stakeholder had signed as surety five separate notes
for $1,000 each. In his opinion, the maximum liability on the bond did
not mean that the separate claims were against one fund or subject
matter, which is essential for a bill in the nature of interpleader. Mere
multiplicity of distinct suits is not enough. 08 Rule 22100 was considered
inapplicable by Judge Otis, on the ground that "double or multiple lia-
bility" meant such liability on the same obligation. "This plaintiff was
not under the same obligation to any two claimants against it." He
apparently overlooked the fact that the Interpleader Act of 1936 allowed
the suit to be entertained although "the claims . . . are not identical."
107. 105 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939), rezg, 26 F. Supp. 956 (W. D. Mo. 1939).
108. Judge Otis said that the "admirably expressed views" of Judge Chesnut in John
Hancock Life Ins. Co. v. Kegan, 22 F. Supp. 326 (D. Md. 1938) could not prevail against
all authority.
109. Quoted pp. 379-380 supra. See end of note 106 mtpra.
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Fortunately, the circuit court of appeals found the independent equit-
able ground for a bill in the nature of interpleader (if this be still neces-
sary since Rule 22 took effect) in the fact that the aggregate demands
of the claimants exceeded the maximum liability of the surety. This
seems to me to constitute a fund. Although some of Judge Gardner's
language about mutual exclusiveness is open to question,"10 he clearly
realizes that the identity test is no longer in force. The evils of a refusal
of interpleader are emphatically described:
"It may finally be determined that one or two [claimants] only
are entitled to recover, yet judgments might be procured on many
of these claims simultaneously if defendants may proceed to the
prosecution of their various suits. There might not be opportunity
to plead by way of amendment or supplemental answer, the recovery
of a prior judgment against plaintiff [stakeholder] on the same bond.
Again, courts might not permit such a defense because, perchance,
the courts might hold that satisfaction and adjudication of liability
alone would satisfy the requirements of the bond. After recovery of
judgments, execution might issue on all, and plaintiff might find it
impossible to set aside final judgments. Even if it be assumed that
the first to recover judgments or to issue execution should first be
paid until the liability on the bond was exhausted, subsequent claim-
ants in order of recovery on judgment or issuing of execution might
insist that the penalty should be apportioned . . ., and liability on
that ground might be asserted. In these circumstances there is a
real threat of liability, and it was to meet such a situation that the
interpleader statutes were adopted ...
"It appears here that the aggregate of the claims is far in excess
of plaintiff's liability. In such circumstances, each claimant is inter-
ested in reducing or defeating the claim of every other claimant, and
the adversity of claim required by statute is, we think, satisfied."m
This decision is strong authority for interpleader in a different situa-
tion where relief is badly needed. An insurance company issues a liability
policy with a $10,000 limit to an automobile owner. By statute and the
110. Compare what he says on p. 581 (top of 2d column) [Standard Surety & Cas-
ualty Co. v. Baker, 105 F. (2d) 578 (C. C. A. 8th, 1939)] with Chafee, Modervicng
Interpleader (1921) 30 YALE L. J. 814, SI-819; (1909) 22 -LuRv. L. RE- 294 (probably
influenced by Ames); Clark v. Childs, 234 App. Div. 561, 236 N. Y. Supp. 69 (1932).
Although each claim may be partly right under a pro rata distribution, the claims must
be wrong to the enxtent that their total amount exceeds the limit of liability.
111. Standard Surety & Casualty Co. v. Baker, 105 F. (2d) 578, 531-582 (C. C. A.
8th, 1939). Judge Gardner relied on Dugas v. American Surety Co., 300 U. S. 414
(1937), where interpleader was also allowed to a surety subject to a limited liability.
Although the necessary elements of a bill in the nature of interpleader were present in
the Dugas case, it was possible to handle the case as a strict bill, inasmuch as there was
apparently no interest on the stakeholder's part. In the Dugas case, the surety did not
deny the right of any claimant to share in the fund; but in the Balcr case the surety
disputed its liability to some or even all claimants.
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terms of the policy, victims of an accident who recover judgments against
the insured get a direct right of action against the insurance company.
A bad accident occurs, and the company is faced with claims by residents
of different states aggregating far more than $10,000, which have not
yet been reduced to judgments. Can the insurance company, after paying
$10,000 into court, interplead the victims by confining their rights under
the policy to this fund and enjoining them from otherwise proceeding
against the company? Before the 1936 Act, such relief was denied in
Klaber v. Maryland Casualty Company."2 A strict bill of interpleader
was held not to lie, for the company was strongly interested in the con-
troversy because of its duty under the policy to defend pending and future
accident suits brought by the victims against the automobile owner. And
a bill in the nature of interpleader was held impossible because not named
in the 1926 Act.
It was hoped that the new clause in the 1936 Act authorizing such bills
would enable the United States courts to handle controversies like the
Klaber case. Although no automobile liability insurance case has arisen
under this Act, the Baker case is closely analogous because it also involves
a limited liability on the part of an insurance company. The bad conse-
quences described by Judge Gardner will exist unless the company can
force all the victims of the automobile accident to resort to the sum
deposited in court.
At the same time, it would be undesirable to go quite so far in an
automobile accident controversy as in the Baker case of the bankrupt
broker. There the claimants were barred from suing the insured at law,
and the amount of each claim against him was fixed by a court in the
bankruptcy proceedings. (The second stage of the interpleader decided
whether a claim so fixed was enforceable against the fund in court, and
for how much.) On the other hand, in a situation like the Klaber case,
the victims of the automobile accident should not be enjoined from suing
the insured at law before a jury. That is the proper way to determine
the validity and amount of each accident claim. Although claims arising
out of brokerage failures are often handled in equity or bankruptcy
without juries, automobile accident claims are peculiarly appropriate for
jury trial. Hence, when an automobile liability insurance company is
allowed to interplead, the law actions of the victims should be allowed
to proceed for the purpose of determining such issues as negligence,
contributory negligence, and the extent of the damage, with the insurance
company fighting its best. Judgments at law against the insured will
then be entered on the verdicts. But the enforcement of those judgments
against the insurance company and its property should be enjoined. The
112. 69 F. (2d) 934 (C. C. A. 8th, 1934), discussed by Chafee (1936) 45 YALE L. J.
1161, 1163-1167. Here one victim had already obtained a judgment against the insured,
for less than the maximum limit in the policy.
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judgment creditors should be left to get payment from the fund in court,
either ratably or according to some scheme of priority imposed by the
court in accordance with prior local decisions. Thus the second stage
wil not be concerned with determining the validity and fixing the amount
of the claims, but only with the distribution of the fund. In that task
the insurance company should probably not participate.
WHAT LAW GOVERNS THE SECOND STATE OF INTERPLE.-DER
While the doctrine of Swift v. Tyson n 3 was in force, the rights of
claimants to life insurance or other substantive matters in the second
stage of interpleader could be decided, in the absence of a state statute,
by rules of "general law" worked out by United States courts inde-
pendently of the decisions of state courts." 4 The situation was entirely
changed when Erie Railroad Company v. Tompkins n' overruled Szift
v. Tyson and held that United States courts are bound to apply the law
of a state as established by the courts of that state. This new doctrine
has been followed in the second stage of several interpleader cases under
the Act of 1936.6 And a decree in the nature of interpleader cancelling
a reinstated life insurance policy for fraud, under the general diversity
jurisdiction, was remanded by the Supreme Court after the Erie Railroad
case with instructions to redetermine the case on the basis of state
decisions."
However, the Erie Railroad case creates a host of new problems in
place of those it ends. For example, uniformity of judicial doctrines on
private law inside a state has been obtained at the sacrifice of nationwide
uniformity. United States courts tended to follow each other and had
to follow the Supreme Court. Now, the decisions of the courts of a
state govern, but what state? At least two states are involved in every
interpleader under the Act of 1936. Suppose that two claimants reside
in X and Y, whose respective courts have laid down different rules as
to the issue in the second stage. A federal interpleader suit is filed in a
district court in X. The decisions in X ought not to govern merely
113. 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842).
114. Kansas City Life Ins. Co. v. Adamson, 24 F. (2d) 712 (N. D. Texas, 1928);
Chafee (1936) 45 YAm. L. J. 1161, 1180.
115. 304 U. S. 64 (1938), abundantly discussed in law reviews.
116. Toomey v. Toomey, 98 F. (2d) 736 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), noted on the merits
in (1939) 33 Iii.. L. REv. 732; New England Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Spence, 104 F. (2d)
665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939), rezg, 25 F. Supp. 633 (AV. D. N. Y. 1938); MuL Life Ins.
Co. v. Richardson, 27 F. Supp. 791 (W. D. La. 1939).
117. Rosenthal v. New York Life Ins. Co., 304 U. S. 263 (1938), vacating judgment
h; 94 F. (2d) 675 (C. C. A. 8th, 1938). After redetermination, cancellation v.-as again
granted in 99 F. (2d) 578 (1938).
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because the forum is in that state."' The stakeholder is free under the
Act to lay the venue in either X or Y, and should not be able to swing
the substantive rights of the claimants this way or that. The purpose
of the Interpleader Act was to give the stakeholder protection, but in
nowise to change the rights of the claimants by its operation. Therefore,
some principle of conflict of laws must be found by the United States
court to determine which group of state decisions is to govern. This
means that perplexing conflicts questions will frequently arise in federal
interpleader cases. To make matters worse, suppose that each state has
its own conflicts doctrine. Can the United States courts then apply a
"general law" of conflicts?
The difficulty created by the Erie Railroad case is already illustrated
by New England Mutual Life Insurance Company v. Spence.119 A Mas-
sachusetts life insurance company issued a policy payable to the wife of
the insured, without power to change the beneficiary. The couple were
then living in New York, and the contract was made either there or in
Massachusetts. Later the couple moved to Texas, where the wife got
a divorce. She returned to New York and remarried. After the death
of the insured, the company interpleaded the divorced wife and a Texan
who had been appointed New York administrator. By Texas law, a
divorce eliminates the wife, and transfers the insurance to the insured
husband. By New York and Massachusetts law, a divorce has no effect
upon the wife's vested interest as beneficiary. The district court and
Circuit Judge Charles Clark thought that New York law governed; but
Circuit Judges Learned Hand and Patterson applied Texas law, and
gave the insurance to the administrator.
Special complications arise when a garnishment has been obtained
by one or more creditors. Under the 1926 Act, the Supreme Court held
in Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works'20 that under certain procedure
garnishment of a fire insurance company in X by a creditor of the insured
had the effect of impounding the insurance obligation in X and making
it subject to X's law with respect to exemptions, which were asserted
by the insured as opposing claimant. The influence of the subsequent
1936 Act and the doctrine of the Sanders case upon other garnishment
situations was discussed in a previous article, and has recently received
extensive consideration by other writers.'21 If both claimants have ob-
tained garnishments in different states, and the law of each state gives
118. The contention that the state law of the forum should govern was rejected in
Sanders v. Armour Fertilizer Works, 292 U. S. 190-200 (1934). Although this decision
antedated the Erie Railroad case, the reasoning still holds good.
119. 104 F. (2d) 665 (C. C. A. 2d, 1939). See (1939) 49 YALE L. J. 335.
120. 292 U. S. 190 (1934).
121. Chafee (1936) 45 YAri L. J. 1161, 1176-1180; Holt, Federal Interpleader Act




priority to its own garnishment, then the Erie Railroad case creates a
puzzle which is baffling indeed. Formerly, the United States courts could
determine priority according to federal doctrines. Now, must they look
to state decisions in order to choose between state decisions?
Fortunately, this puzzle has not arisen in the two recent interpleader
cases involving garnishment, since only one of the claimants had gar-
nished. In Cramer v. Phoenix Mutual Life Insurance Conpany,'- the
dispute was between the named beneficiary in a life insurance policy and
some relatives of the insured who claimed equitable ownership of the
policy by virtue of loans to the insured. These alleged equitable assignees
garnished Connecticut banks which were indebted to the insurance com-
pany stakeholder. Interpleader was brought in a United States court in
Ohio. It was held that the doctrine of the Sanders case, where the stake-
holder was garnished, did not apply. So the garnishment did not fix
the res in Connecticut. The garnishing claimants showed no previous
right to the insured money, and they could not turn a bad claim into a
good one by garnishment.
In Roberts v. Mlletropolitan Life Insurance Company,m there was a
dispute between assignees of the beneficiary and his creditor, who had
garnished the insurance company stakeholder. The assigm-nent was made
in New York after the Illinois garnishment action began, but before the
writ was served. The situation was quite different from the Sanders case,
where the dispute was between the garnishing creditor and the principal
debtor (the insured). Here the dispute was as to which claimant had
acquired the interest of the insured first? Obviously the garnishing
creditor can stand no higher than the principal debtor. So the garnish-
ment avails the creditor claimant nothing, if, as in the Cramer case, the
principal debtor never owned the res, or if, as alleged in the Roberts case,
the principal debtor had parted with his ownership prior to garnishment.
Hence, the court in the Roberts case refused to apply the Sanders case,
or to decide that the garnishment necessarily impounded the res and
made Illinois law govern. However, the garnishing creditor won because
the assignment was in fraud of creditors.
The next few years are likely to see an increasing use of the Inter-
pleader Act of 1936, especially by new types of stakeholders, and further
interpretation of the "disputes" clause in Rule 22. Experience will show
whether the Act needs to be amended to give United States courts nation-
wide power to compel the appearance of witnesses,'- 4 just as they can
now compel the appearance of parties regardless of the state of residence.
122. 91 F. (2d) 141, 147-148 (C. C. A. Sth, 1937), aff'g, Phoenix Mut. Life Ins.
Co. v. Lafferty, 16 F. Supp. 740 (S. D. IoNa 1936).
123. 94 F. (2d) 277 (C. C. A. 7th, 1938), cert. denied, 303 U. S. 6 0 (1938); (1939)
27 ILL. B. J. 165.
124. See Burchmore, supra note 1, at 169-170.
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